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EXECUTIVE POWER IN YOUNGSTOWN'S 
SHADOWS 
Patricia L. Bellia* 
INTRODUCTION 
"We can hardly expect that the lasting outgrowth of the 
steel controversy will be the Youngstown case."1 This projection 
captures the sentiment of much of the early academic commen-
tarf on the Supreme Court's decision invalidating President 
Truman's seizure of the nation's steel industry in the spring of 
1952.3 For Professor EdwardS. Corwin, the decision was "a judi-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful to A.J. Bel-
lia, Bill Kelley, Marty Lederman, Liz Magill, John Nagle, and Bill Treanor for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to Dwight King of the Kresge Law Li-
brary for his research help. I thank Tamara Dugan and Gretchen Heinze for excellent 
research assistance. 
I. Jerre Williams, The Steel Seizure: A Legal Analysis of a Political Controversy, 2 
J. Pub. L. 29, 34 (1953). 
2. It was, however, perhaps at odds with the reaction of the general public. See, 
e.g., Steel: Theory and Practice, N.Y. Times 28 (June 3, 1952) ("We have, in the opinion 
delivered by Justice Black yesterday and sustained by five other justices, a redefinition of 
the powers of the President."). 
3. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see, e.g., Edward 
S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 53, 
64-65 (1953) ("Youngstown will probably go down in history as an outstanding example 
of the sic vola, sic jubeo frame of mind into which the Court is occasionally maneuvered 
by the public context of the case before it."); Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1951 
Term-Foreword: The Year of the Steel Case, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 89, 95 (1952) (characteriz-
ing the majority opinion as offering a "rigid conception of the separation of powers," and 
predicting that the Court in the future would be forced to disavow that conception); 
Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., The Steel Case: Presidential Responsibility and Judicial Irre-
sponsibility, G.W. Pol. Q. 61,64-65 (1953) ("The decision in the Steel case is so much out 
of step with the way in which the American system of government functions that it can-
not long stand as a guidepost in the development of United States constitutional law."). 
But see L.B. Lea, The Steel Case: Presidential Seizure of Private Industry, 47 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 289, 289 (1952) ("The Supreme Court's decision on June 2, 1952, invalidating the 
President's seizure of the steel industry, is certain to become a landmark case in our con-
stitutional jurisprudence.") (footnote omitted); Paul G. Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: 
Congress, the President, and the Supreme Coun, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 141, 143 (1952) (argu-
ing that Youngstown assumes "a significance of large dimensions" with respect to 
broader questions of judicial review). 
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cial brick without straw"- the opinion of the Court resting on a 
"purely arbitrary construct,"4 Justice Jackson's "rather desul-
tory" concurring opinion containing "little that is of direct perti-
nence to the constitutional issue,"5 and the other concurring 
opinions contributing nothing "to the decision's claim to be re-
garded seriously as a doctrine of constitutional law."6 Scholars 
who observed the crisis and pronounced the Court's decision 
"destined to be ignored"7 might have been surprised at the 
thought that, fifty years later, a law review would devote all of its 
pages to a commemoration of the Youngstown case. 
The claims of Youngstown's detractors likewise would sur-
prise modern first-year law students, who find the case promi-
nently featured in the separation of powers section of their con-
stitutional law case books,8 who highlight Justice Jackson's 
discussion of three categories of executive action,9 and who ex-
tract from the majority and concurrences evidence of "formal" 
versus "functional" analysis in separation of powers disputes. 10 
4. Corwin, 53 Colum. L. Rev. at 53, 64 (cited in note 3). 
5. !d. at 63. 
6. !d. at 65. 
7. Schubert, G.W. Pol. Q. at 65 (cited in note 3). 
8. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 232 (Aspen Publishers, 2001); 
Jesse H. Choper, eta!., The American Constitution 114 (Aspen Publishers, 2001); Daniel 
A. Farber, et a!., Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 917 (West, 2d ed. 1997); 
Geoffrey R. Stone, et a!., Constitutional Law 392 (Little Brown and Co., 3d ed. 1996); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 333 (Foundation Press, 
14th ed. 2001). 
9. See 343 U.S. at 635-38. 
10. For commentary on the formal and functional strands in the Youngstown opin-
ions, see, e.g., Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1513, 1522-31 & nn.55, 59 (1991) (describing formal and functional approaches and 
using Justice Black's and Justice Jackson's opinions, respectively, as examples); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of 
Powers Cases, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 21, 23-24 (1988) (highlighting the formalist rea-
soning of Justice Black's opinion and the functionalist strains in the concurrences; argu-
ing that Youngstown indicates that formalism and functionalism "are frequently and 
maybe typically interconnected"); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic 
Constitution, 46 Duke L.J. 679, 691 & n.l25 (1997) (characterizing the reasoning in Jus-
tice Black's Youngstown opinion as "exaggerated formalism" and noting the Supreme 
Court's description of Justice Jackson's opinion as reflecting "'the pragmatic, flexible 
view of differentiated governmental power"' (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 381 (1989))); Martin H. Redish and Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were To Govern": 
The Need for Pragmatic Realism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L.J. 449, 486 
(1991) (advocating a "pragmatic formalist" approach to resolving separation of powers 
disputes, and arguing that Justice Jackson's approach in Youngstown is inconsistent with 
that model); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-
Executive Separation of Powers, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 430, 439 (1987) (suggesting that Jus-
tice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown rejects "single-minded devotion to the ana-
lytics of separation" as "inflexible and unrealistic"); Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial 
Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 S. Ct. Rev. 357, 362-63 (distinguishing for-
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The weight of scholarship, too, has shifted. Many who study the 
balance of congressional and presidential power, especially in 
the area of foreign affairs, view Justice Jackson's concurrence in 
Youngstown as providing a sensible framework for resolving the 
conflicting claims of the two branches 11 and decry this frame-
work's alleged erosion in subsequent case law. 12 One constitu-
tional scholar even found Justice Jackson's opinion to be-as of 
1996, at least- "the most truly intellectually satisfying ... opin-
ion in our two-hundred-year constitutional history." 13 And some 
malist and functionalist approaches and characterizing Justice Black's opinion as an ex-
ample of the former). For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between formal 
and functional approaches to separation of powers questions, see generally M. Elizabeth 
Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127 (2000). 
11. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 94-96 
(Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 1996) (stating that Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in 
Youngstown "has become a starting point for constitutional discussion of concurrent 
powers"); Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution 105 (Yale U. Press, 
1990) (arguing that Justice Jackson's concurrence articulates "with unusual clarity ... the 
concept of balanced institutional participation" in the foreign policy process); Gordon 
Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers 105-07 (Oxford U. Press, 1997) (analyzing separation of 
powers questions under Justice Jackson's framework); see also Abraham D. Sofaer, War, 
Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins 382 n.l8 (Bellinger Publishing 
Company, 1976) (describing Justice Jackson's opinion as "deservedly famous"); Harold 
H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1, 10-12 
(1982) (calling Youngstown the "principal modern authority on the relationship between 
the President and Congress" and observing that "(i]t is Justice Jackson's famous [concur-
rence] that has most influenced subsequent analysis"); Joel L. Fleishman and Arthur H. 
Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation, 40 L. & Contemp. 
Probs. I, 19 (1976) (suggesting that Justice Jackson's framework in Youngstown "remains 
the most definitive account" of how to analyze questions of executive authority); Paul 
Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 343, 352 
(1989) ("[T]oday it is almost universally believed that the more narrowly framed concur-
ring opinions in (Youngstown] capture what it really 'stands for."'); Thomas A. 
O'Donnell, Comment, Illumination or Elimination of the Zone of Twilight? Congres-
sional Acquiescence and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs, 51 U. Cin. L. Rev. 95, 
99 & n.35 (1982) (noting influence of Justice Jackson's concurrence). 
12. See, e.g., Koh, The National Security Constitution at 142 (cited in note 11) (dis-
cussing cases, including Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), and INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), that "dramatically alter the application of Justice Jackson's 
tripartite Youngstown analysis in cases on foreign affairs"); Silverstein, Imbalance of 
Powers at 11-12 (cited in note 11) (arguing that courts "began to soften the barriers" be-
tween Justice Jackson's categories in the decades following the Youngstown decision, 
thus lending "legitimacy to the emerging executive claim to prerogative powers in foreign 
policy"); Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Pol-
icy, 103 Yale L.J. 2391, 2421 (1994) (challenging Supreme Court's upholding of govern-
ment policy to return possible refugees to Haiti; arguing that Court failed to recognize 
that Congress had disabled the President from granting Attorney General unreviewable 
discretion to return refugees, and that case thus fell within Justice Jackson's third cate-
gory). 
13. Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in Peter Brooks and 
Paul Gewirtz, cds., Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law 187, 202 (Yale U. 
Press, 1996); see also Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Why Select a Favorite Case?, 74 
Tex. L. Rev. 1195, 1196-97 (1996) ("(Justice Jackson's opinion] is one of the few opinions 
90 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:87 
regard Youngstown not only as a significant case in the Supreme 
Court's separation of powers jurisprudence, but also as a turning 
point in the Court's handling of politically charged constitutional 
questions. 14 
In light of the importance the legal academy attaches to the 
Youngstown case, it is perhaps hazardous to submit that Profes-
sor Corwin had the better of the argument. I will not go so far as 
to say that. The Youngstown decision well deserves its status as a 
landmark case in our constitutional jurisprudence. But Youngs-
town, I will argue, is a landmark case for what it symbolizes, not 
for what it says. And it is dangerous for us to confuse the two. 
What Youngstown symbolizes is the notion that actions do 
not achieve the status of law merely because they are the actions 
of the government. The case no doubt deters some executive 
conduct of questionable legality. And the case will always add 
weight to the proposition that the judiciary has the power, and in 
some cases the obligation, to review and invalidate the actions of 
a coordinate branch of government on separation of powers 
grounds. Courts invoke Youngstown in the most delicate of cases 
involving abuses of power, even when the case is quite far off 
point. 15 
But courts and scholars put Youngstown to more work than 
this. The case has special significance for disputes involving the 
relative powers of Congress and the President in foreign affairs 
matters-where the Constitution says little, controversies are 
frequent, judicial resolutions are few, and the stakes are high. 16 
that make me truly proud to be a constitutional lawyer or to believe in the notion of what 
Ronald Dworkin calls legal 'integrity.'"). I should be clear that Professor Levinson favors 
Justice Jackson's opinion for "the interplay of persona and analysis" that its rhetoric re-
veals, not for its conclusions on the questions of presidential power, to which Levinson 
ascribes "almost no importance." Id. at 1198. 
14. Constitutional historian Macva Marcus, for example, invites us to see the 
Youngstown decision as dealing "a telling blow to the ... doctrine ... that each branch of 
government was the arbiter of its own powers and responsibilities," thus influencing the 
Court's decisions to address important constitutional questions in the context of other 
controversial cases, including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Maeva Mar-
cus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The Limits of Presidential Power 248 (Columbia 
U. Press, 1977); see id. at 228-48. For a discussion of this aspect of Marcus's project, see 
William H. Harbaugh, The Steel Seizure Reconsidered, 87 Yale L.J. 1272, 1281-83 (1978). 
15. See text accompanying notes 116-122. 
16. Not surprisingly, questions about the proper balance of power between the 
President and Congress surfaced in connection with the U.S. response to the September 
11 attacks, particularly with respect to the President's order providing for the trial of sus-
pected terrorists before military tribunals. Military Order-Detention, Treatment, and 
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. 
Doc. 1665 (Nov. 13, 2001); see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Fury, New Republic, 
2002] YOUNGSTOWN'S SHADOWS 91 
Although not itself a paradigmatic foreign affairs case, Youngs-
town is thought to bear on separation of powers questions touch-
ing on foreign affairs in a number of ways. First, for those who 
would argue that the President lacks any independent, "implied" 
powers to formulate and carry out foreign policy, the Court's 
opinion in Youngstown stands as the high water mark. 17 Second, 
Justice Jackson's concurrence offers something of a blueprint for 
resolving disputes between the President and Congress, bringing 
together, as the Court put it in 1981, "as much combination of 
analysis and common sense as there is in this area." 18 Scholars 
who argue that the Constitution lodges most foreign affairs pow-
ers in Congress find in Justice Jackson's concurrence a recogni-
tion of congressional primacy-that presidential powers fluctu-
ate, "depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those 
of Congress."19 
I will argue that the lessons that the case-and in particular, 
Justice Jackson's concurrence-offers in the foreign affairs area 
are less clear and less helpful than is often believed. It is a mis-
take to assume that Youngstown carries a doctrinal weight equal 
to its rhetorical or symbolic power. First, to the extent that the 
Youngstown decision is thought to foreclose claims of implied 
presidential power in foreign affairs, the better reading of the 
case suggests otherwise. Second, Justice Jackson's tripartite 
framework for evaluating executive action is not a framework at 
all, nor did he necessarily intend it to be.20 
More important, Justice Jackson's opinion sends mixed sig-
nals about who is best able to police executive conduct-
Congress or the courts. Justice Jackson clearly envisioned a role 
Dec. 10, 2001, at 18-19 (arguing that Congress should intervene to cut back on Presi-
dent's order). 
17. I use the phrase "implied powers" to describe powers that flow from the Consti-
tution, but that are based on inferences from specific textual grants or from the structure 
the Constitution creates. I distinguish the concept of implied powers flowing from the 
Constitution from claims that the Executive possesses "inherent" foreign affairs author-
ity, not created or constrained by the Constitution. Of course, those who believe that the 
text and structure of the Constitution vest few foreign affairs powers in the President ar-
gue that so-called implied powers are extraconstitutional. See notes 128-139, 149-151, and 
accompanying text. I do not use the phrase "implied powers" to encompass powers Con-
gress impliedly delegates to the President. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power 
of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1993) (distinguishing implied legislative au-
thorization from implied constitutional powers). 
18. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,661 (1981). 
19. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
20. See id. (describing grouping of presidential actions in relation to powers of 
Congress as "somewhat oversimplified" and as providing a means to "distinguish( ] 
roughly" the legal consequences of presidential conduct). 
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for the courts in policing the boundaries between different cate-
gories of executive action, to determine which actions Congress 
has expressly or impliedly authorized or forbidden. Many schol-
ars take this to mean that courts should narrowly construe stat-
utes conferring foreign affairs authority on the Executive 
Branch; to do otherwise is to entrench a shift in power from 
Congress to the President.21 Justice Jackson seemed to envision 
a smaller role for courts, however, when Congress is silent. In 
that situation, he suggested, "any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary impon-
derables rather than on abstract theories of law."22 Even some 
scholars who believe that Congress has primary foreign affairs 
power acknowledge a diminished role for courts in this category 
of cases; they assume that the President possesses some "initiat-
ing"23 or "concurrent"24 powers and can exercise those powers 
until Congress acts?5 As a result, Congress bears the primary re-
sponsibility for policing the Executive Branch. Those who be-
lieve that the President has more substantial foreign affairs au-
thorities, of course, are likely to share this view that a court's 
21. Sec, e.g., David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in David 
Gray Adler and Larry N. George, eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American 
Foreign Policy 19, 32-35 (U. Press of Kansas, 1996) (criticizing the Supreme Court's 
treatment of congressional delegation to Secretary of State of power to issue passports); 
Koh, The National Security Constitution at 146 (cited in note 11) ("[T]he Supreme 
Court's reading of these statutes has enhanced presidential power by encouraging law-
yers throughout the executive branch to construe their agency's authorizing statutes to 
permit executive initiatives extending far beyond the intended scope of those statutes."). 
22. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
23. Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 15 (Princeton U. Press, 1990). 
24. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution at 92, 94 (cited in note 11) 
(recognizing "some undefined zone of concurrent authority in which [the President and 
Congress] might act, at least when the other has not acted"; noting that concept of con-
current authority "is now accepted"); Koh, The National Security Constitution at 109 
(cited in note 11) (discussing zone of concurrent authority). 
25. Sec, e.g., Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 15-16 (cited in note 23) ("The 
Constitution sometimes appears silent with respect to issues of decision-making author-
ity. In such circumstances, concurrent power is said to exist in both political branches .... 
The President's initiatives here are contingently constitutional; their validity depends 
upon congressional inaction."); Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution at 36 
(cited in note 11) ("Except where the Constitution expressly allocates power to Congress 
and implies that it is exclusive of the President, there is increasingly less disposition to 
deny the President power to act where Congress had not acted."); Phillip R. Trimble, The 
President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 750,757 (1989) ("The foreign affairs 
prerogative protects the ability of the Executive, subject to ex post facto review by Con-
gress, to determine ... what action to take or not to take in communicating and negotiat-
ing with foreign governments and other international actors to settle pressing interna-
tional problems."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: 
Providing a Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 863, 874-76 (1983) (noting 
cases in which "the Court has implicitly adopted a framework whereby the President may 
take any action not expressly prohibited by the Constitution or statute"). 
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role in reviewinR executive action in the face of congressional si-
lence is limited. 6 
The guidance scholars draw from Justice Jackson's concur-
rence, I will argue, is precisely backwards. Courts faced with the 
question whether a statute authorizes challenged executive con-
duct should do no more than apply ordinary delegation princi-
ples, leaving Congress to legislate against the backdrop of those 
principles. To require courts to construe foreign affairs delega-
tions narrowly solely to preserve supposed congressional foreign 
affairs prerogatives is to force courts to make policy judgments 
better left to Congress. When the question is how to evaluate 
presidential conduct not traceable under ordinary delegation 
principles to a statutory authorization, however, the calculus is 
different. Any such conduct must rest on the President's consti-
tutional powers-whether Congress is silent or opposed. In 
other words, the notion that presidential powers "fluctuate"27 is 
misleading. The Constitution either grants the President a par-
ticular power or it does not. Congressional silence cannot create 
power where none exists; at most, silence might indicate some-
thing about what Congress believes the President's constitutional 
authority to be. 
To the extent that Justice Jackson's approach suggests that 
law has little role to play when Congress is silent, that approach 
contains the seeds of a misplaced political question doctrine, al-
lowing courts to skirt questions of executive power even when 
other justiciability requirements are met. Once this route of judi-
cial deference is open, it is all too tempting for courts to follow 
it-not only when Congress is silent, but when the President's 
conduct conflicts with congressional policy. In short, courts tend 
to avoid exploring the President's constitutional foreign affairs 
powers-express or implied-instead finding congressional au-
thorization in questionable circumstances or simply assuming 
that presidential action should stand as long as Congress is silent. 
This failure to develop a coherent theory of presidential power, I 
argue, has an impact far beyond the specific questions about the 
distribution of powers in the few separation of powers cases that 
26. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: 
An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1999). Powell makes a 
somewhat broader argument, that judicial decisions on foreign affairs matters are "pecu-
liarly unlikely to generate broad doctrinal frameworks," and that, since the Constitution 
confers authority over foreign affairs and national security on the political branches, 
there is a "risk that judicial intervention will itself be a serious violation of separation of 
powers." Id. 
27. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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courts actually face. Executive Branch lawyers regularly encoun-
ter complicated questions about the President's foreign affairs 
power. To the extent that courts' consideration of executive 
power questions would limit the acceptable and persuasive forms 
of argument available to the Executive Branch, courts' silence 
compromises one of the most effective restraints on executive 
conduct. And to the extent that courts' consideration of execu-
tive power questions would affirm the Executive Branch's mode 
of analysis, courts' silence unnecessarily prompts others to doubt 
the legitimacy of Executive Branch views. 
The Article has three parts. Part I introduces the circum-
stances of the steel crisis and outlines the Supreme Court's re-
sponse to President Truman's seizure of the steel mills. As is well 
known, much of the reasoning in the concurring opinions of Jus-
tices who joined the majority is in tension with the rationale un-
derlying the opinion of the Court. This tension fueled the critical 
commentary of the day. Among the questions observers ex-
pected the Court to resolve was whether the President can lay 
claim to powers not expressly enumerated in the Constitution. 
The Court appeared to answer that question in the negative, but 
the concurring opinions deprived that answer of its force. In-
deed, for all of the rhetoric in the opinion to the contrary, the 
logic of Justice Jackson's concurrence depends on acceptance of 
at least some implied presidential powers. 
In Part II, I discuss the significance of the Youngstown opin-
ions in separation of powers controversies, particularly before 
the Supreme Court. I postpone treatment of cases touching on 
the proper allocation of power between the President and Con-
gress in foreign affairs and national security matters. In the bal-
ance of cases, courts most often invoke the Youngstown opin-
ions-particularly the concurrences of Justice Frankfurter and 
Justice Jackson-to justify a flexible, pragmatic approach to 
separation of powers questions. But this fact alone cannot ac-
count for Youngstown's prominence in our constitutional juris-
prudence, because the language in the concurrences is suffi-
ciently open-ended to support a number of different outcomes in 
any given case. What gives Youngstown its power is that it stands 
as an example of a court invalidating the actions of a coordinate 
branch of government on separation of powers grounds where 
the court perceives an abuse of office. When a court wields this 
weapon, it can take some cover in Youngstown's shadows. And 
the possibility of a court exercising this power disciplines the Ex-
ecutive Branch. 
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In Part III, I turn to Youngstown's role in questions involv-
ing the balance of presidential and legislative power in foreign 
affairs and national security. The Youngstown case is of special 
importance to scholars who believe that the Constitution is best 
read to lodge most foreign affairs powers with Congress. They 
criticize courts' treatment of disputes between the Executive and 
Congress on two grounds: that courts too broadly interpret con-
gressional delegations; and that courts ignore opposition to ex-
ecutive conduct, painting executive action in a light favorable to 
the Executive Branch. As I will argue, what courts often treat as 
questions about congressional delegation and congressional in-
tent are really questions about the President's constitutional 
powers. The approach of Justice Jackson's concurrence places 
too much reliance on courts to police executive action by locat-
ing ill-defined boundaries between categories that turn on Con-
gress's implied will; and too little reliance on courts to identify 
and limit presidential powers based on inferences from the text 
and structure of the Constitution. 
I. THE YOUNGSTOWN DECISION AND THE SCOPE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
For modern students of constitutional law, the Youngstown 
decision often provides the first exposure to the Supreme 
Court's treatment of disputes concerning the appropriate distri-
bution of powers among branches of the federal government.28 1t 
is convenient, then, for teachers to use the opinion of the Court 
by Justice Black and the concurring opinions, particularly those 
of Justice Jackson and Justice Frankfurter, to illustrate the di-
vergent approaches to resolving separation of powers controver-
sies that resurface in the Court's later decisions. Something is 
lost, however, in the effort to simplify the case to extract warring 
strands of formal and functional reasoning. What frustrated 
Corwin and his contemporaries was that the opinion of the 
Court and the concurring opinions of several Justices who joined 
it differed not only in the methodology they applied, but also in 
the answer they provided to what seemed to be the crucial ques-
tion in the case-whether the President might possess authority, 
either as part of the "executive Power" the Constitution vests in 
him29 or otherwise implied from the text and structure of the 
Constitution, to take certain action in a national emergency in 
28. See note 8. 
29. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1. 
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the absence of specific congressional authorization.3° Far from 
concluding that the President lacked such power in all circum-
stances, a majority of Justices on the Youngstown Court left the 
question open or embraced the concept of implied power. As I 
will argue in Parts II and Ill, this aspect of the case's treatment 
of presidential power is often ignored, or its significance misun-
derstood. 
A. THE STEEL SEIZURE 
The circumstances surrounding President Truman's execu-
tive order directing his Secretary of Commerce to take control of 
the steel indust~ in April of 1952 have been recounted exten-
sively elsewhere. 1 In brief, the order responded to a dispute be-
tween the nation's steel companies and their employees over the 
terms of new collective bargaining agreements to replace those 
set to expire on December 31, 1951. When negotiations failed, 
the employees' representative, the United Steelworkers of 
America, C.I.O., gave notice of its intention to call a strike upon 
the expiration of the existing agreements.32 On December 22, 
1951, after other federal mediation efforts were unsuccessful, 
President Truman referred the dispute to the federal Wage Sta-
bilization Board to recommend a settlement.33 The steel compa-
nies rejected the settlement, and after further negotiations 
stalled, the union renewed its notice of a nationwide strike to 
begin on April 9.34 
A day before the strike was to begin, the President issued 
Executive Order 10340.35 The order's preamble stated that "steel 
is an indispensable component of substantially all ... weapons 
and materials" needed by U.S. armed forces then engaged in the 
Korean conflict.36 As a result, "a work stoppage would immedi-
ately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the de-
fense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would 
30. See, e.g., Freund, 66 Harv. L. Rev. at 95 (cited in note 3) (arguing that "[a]s a 
guide for the future, the opinions [in Youngstown] will surely point in various direc-
tions"). 
31. In addition to the opinion of the Court in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-84, see 
especially Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 58-82 (cited in note 14); Lea, 47 
Nw. U L. Rev. at 290-92 (cited in note 3). 
32. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582. 
33. Statement by the President on the Labor Dispute in the Steel Industry, 1951 
Pub. Papers 651 (Dec. 22, 1951). 
34. 343 U.S. at 583. 
35. 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 10, 1952). 
36. Id. 
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add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen 
engaged in combat in the field. "37 The order directed the Secre-
tary of Commerce "to take possession of all or such of the 
plants, facilities, and other property" of the steel companies "as 
he may deem necessary in the interests of national defense"38 
and authorized the Secretary to prescribe terms and conditions 
of employment.39 In turn, the Secretary issued orders taking pos-
session of most of the steel mills and directing the presidents of 
the companies to maintain their operations.40 On April 9, 1952, 
the President reported these steps to Congress, which took no 
action.41 
The steel companies immediately filed suit in federal district 
court in the District of Columbia, claiming that the President 
and Secretary of Commerce lacked authority to issue the orders 
in question and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions 
against their enforcement. On April29, the district court granted 
a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from "continu-
ing the seizure and possession of the plants ... and from actin,a 
under the purported authority of Executive Order No. 10340." 
The court of appeals immediately stayed the injunction,43 and 
both the steel companies and the Government petitioned the 
Supreme Court for immediate review. Meanwhile, the White 
House had encouraged the industry and the union to reach an 
agreement and indicated that in the absence of such an agree-
ment, the government would grant a wage increase. When the 
Supreme Court granted review, it continued but modified the 
court of appeals' stay of the district court's injunction: the Court 
directed the Secretary of Commerce not to alter the terms and 
conditions of employment.44 At that point, the ongoing talks be-
tween the companies and the leaders of the union collapsed, and 
both sides awaited the Supreme Court's decision on the validity 
of the seizure. 45 
37. Id. at 3141. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. 17 Fed. Reg. 3242 (Apr. 12, 1952). 
41. H.R. Doc. No. 82-422 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 883. 
42. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569,577 (D.D.C. 1952). 
43. Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952). 
44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937-38 (1952). 
45. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 147-48 (cited in note 14). 
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B. THE COURT'S DECISION 
On June 2, 1952, less than three weeks after hearing oral ar-
gument in the case, the Court affirmed the district court's judg-
ment by a 6 to 3 vote. Writing for the majority, Justice Black de-
voted a mere three-and-a-half pages to resolving the 
constitutional question.46 The Court reasoned that "[t]he Presi-
dent's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an 
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."47 Because it 
found no statute that expressly or impliedly authorized the 
President to take possession of the steel mills, nor any express 
constitutional language granting the power, the Court turned to 
the claim that "presidential power should be imp,lied from the 
aggregate of ... powers under the Constitution. "4 The Court fo-
cused on three provisions of Article II: section 2, designating the 
President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces; section 1, 
stating that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent"; and section 3, providing that the President "shall take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." The Court declined 
to sustain the order under any of these provisions. The Court 
viewed the power to dictate the terms under which the govern-
ment could take possession of private property as a "lawmaking" 
power-as resting within Congress's "exclusive constitutional 
authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the 
powers vested by the Constitution" in the federal government.49 
Because the seizure of property was "a job for the Nation's law-
makers, not for its military authorities," the designation of the 
President as Commander in Chief could not justify the action.50 
And the provisions granting the President the executive power 
and requiring that he take care that the laws be faithfullX exe-
cuted "refute[] the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." 1 The 
Court acknowledged the Government's argument that "other 
Presidents without congressional authority have taken posses-
sion of private business enterprises in order to settle labor dis-
putes"; even if this were true, "Congress has not thereby lost its 
exclusive constitutional authority" to make laws. 52 
46. 343 U.S. at 585-89. 
47. Id. at 585. 
48. Id. at 587. 
49. Id. at 588-89. 
50. Id. at 587. 
51. !d. 
52. Id. at 588. 
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Taken at face value, the opinion for the Court suggests that 
the President possesses only those powers specifically enumer-
ated in the constitutional text, and that some of those constitu-
tional powers (including the "executive Power" and the Com-
mander in Chief authority) should be construed narrowly. No 
other powers can be inferred from the constitutional text or from 
the structure the Constitution creates. But all four of the Justices 
who joined Justice Black's majority opinion-Justices Frank-
furter, Douglas, Jackson, and Burton-wrote separately, high-
lighting varying degrees of disagreement with Justice Black's ra-
tionale.53 Indeed, in an unusual separate statement appended to 
the Court's opinion, Justice Frankfurter noted the importance of 
"[i]ndividual expression of views in reaching a common result," 
because "differences in attitude toward [the] principle [of sepa-
ration of powers) ... can hardly be reflected by a single opinion 
for the Court."5 Only Justice Douglas's opinion explicitly em-
braced Justice Black's characterization of the President's action 
as "legislative" in nature. 55 He reasoned that the Court "could 
not sanction the seizures and condemnations of the steel plants 
in this case without reading Article II as giving the President not 
only the power to execute the laws but to make some," a step 
that would "most assuredly alter the pattern of the Constitu-
tion."56 In light of the commitment of the lawmaking power to 
Congress, the President could not claim an implied power to 
seize the steel mills. Even if the President could take certain ac-
tion as a matter of "expediency or extremity,"57 that action 
would not be lawful until ratified by Congress. 
For the other three Justices who joined Black's opinion-
Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton-and for Justice 
Clark, who concurred only in the judgment,58 the case turned not 
on the characterization of the seizure as a legislative act or on a 
rejection of broad presidential powers, but on the perception 
that the President's action in seizing the steel mills conflicted 
with the authorities Congress had provided the President to deal 
with potential industrial disruptions. In a now famous passage of 
his opinion, Justice Jackson suggested that presidential powers 
"are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
53. See id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); 
id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring). 
54. Id. at 589 (separate statement of Frankfurter, J.). 
55. Id. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
56. Id. at 633. 
57. Id. at 631 n.l. 
58. I d. at 660 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment). 
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conjunction with those of Congress. "59 He offered the following 
grouping of presidential actions and their legal consequences: 
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for 
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate .... 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his 
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in 
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as 
a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on inde-
pendent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual 
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events 
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law. 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its low-
est ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in 
such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon 
the subject. 60 
Justice Jackson viewed President Truman's action as falling 
within the third category, as a measure "incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress."61 Justices Frankfurter 
and Burton agreed, as did Justice Clark. 
Three statutes were relevant to the analysis. First, with the 
Taft-Hartley Act, Congress had authorized the President to re-
spond to a threatened work stoppage that would "imperil the na-
tional health or safety" b¥ appointing a board of inquiry to 
gather facts on the dispute6 and, upon receiving that board's re-
port, seeking injunctive relief for an eighty-day period.63 Second, 
the Selective Service Act of 1948 permitted the President to take 
59. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
60. Id. at 635·38 (footnotes omitted). 
61. Id. at 637. 
62. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 206,61 Stat. 136,155. 
63. Id. §§ 209(b), 210, 61 Stat. at 156 (establishing sixty-day cooling off period plus 
twenty days for voting on employer's offer of settlement, after which time court must 
dissolve injunction). 
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possession of facilities that failed to fill orders placed by the 
Government for goods required for national defense purposes. 64 
Third, the Defense Production Act of 1950 authorized the Presi-
dent to stabilize prices and wages in industries for various pur-
poses, including to prevent disruption of resources necessary for 
the national defense,65 and to mediate labor disputes affecting 
the national defense.66 As amended in 1951, the statute author-
ized the President to institute condemnation proceedin~s to req-
uisition property when needed for the national defense. 
Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, as well as Justice 
Clark, emphasized that the President's seizure of the steel mills 
did not comport with the requirements of these statutes. Presi-
dent Truman had vetoed the Taft-Hartley Act68 and elected not 
to invoke its provisions during the steel crisis.69 In any event, the 
statute did not specifically authorize seizure; in fact, the House 
had considered and rejected an amendment that would have au-
thorized the President to seize an industry to preserve the public 
health and security.70 One of the Senate sponsors of the legisla-
tion specifically noted that the Senate Labor committee had con-
sidered and rejected including a seizure provision.71 The Presi-
dent could not invoke the Selective Service Act, because the 
Government had not placed any orders directly with the steel 
64. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 18(d), 62 Stat. 604,626. 
65. Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, § 402(b), 64 Stat. 798,803. 
66. ld. § 502, 64 Stat. at 812. 
67. See id. § 201(a), 64 Stat. at 799-800 (authorizing President to requisition prop-
erty); Amendments to Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 275, § 102, 65 Stat. 131, 132 
(requiring President to institute condemnation proceedings to obtain real property). 
68. 343 U.S. at 599 n.l (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see 61 Stat. at 162 (noting Taft-
Hartley Act's passage over President's veto). 
69. 343 U.S. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that President did not invoke 
Taft-Hartley Act); id. at 656, 658 (Burton, J., concurring) ("The accuracy with which 
Congress [in the Taft-Hartley Act] describes the present emergency demonstrates [the 
Act's] applicability .... The President, however, chose not to use the Taft-Hartley proce-
dure."); id. at 663 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that President did not in-
voke the Taft-Hartley Act). 
70. 343 U.S. at 599-600 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Authorization for seizure as 
an available remedy for potential dangers was unequivocally put aside."); id. at 639 n.8 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (concurring in Justice Frankfurter's and Justice Burton's discus-
sions of the history of the Taft-Hartley Act); id. at 657 (Burton, J., concurring) ("For the 
purposes of this case the most significant feature of the Act is its omission of authority to 
seize an affected industry. The debate preceding its passage demonstrated the signifi-
cance of that omission."); id. at 663-64 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment) ("At the time 
[the Taft-Hartley Act] was passed, Congress specifically rejected a proposal to empower 
the President to seize .... The legislative history of the Act demonstrates Congress' be-
lief that the 80-day period would afford it adequate opportunity to determine whether 
special legislation should be enacted to meet the emergency at hand."). 
71. Id. at 600 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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plants.72 And although the President had relied on the Defense 
Production Act and his Executive Order implementing it to refer 
the steel dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board,73 he had not 
instituted condemnation proceedings under the Act's provi-
sions.74 
Having established that the President's action was inconsis-
tent with the mechanisms Congress provided the President for 
responding to threatened industrial disruptions, each of the Jus-
tices went on to discuss whether the President's action could 
nevertheless be sustained as an incident of the President's consti-
tutional authority. Here again, the concurring opinions are in 
tension with Justice Black's majority opinion. Focusing on the 
Take Care Clause of Article II, section 3, and the Vesting Clause 
of Article II, section 1, Justice Frankfurter rejected Justice 
Black's suggestion that past executive practice is irrelevant to an 
assessment of the President's constitutional authority: 
The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore 
the way the framework has consistently operated fairly estab-
lishes that it has operated according to its true nature .... In 
short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pur-
sued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to 
uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of 
power part of the structure of our government, may be 
treated as a gloss on "executive Power" vested in the Presi-
dent by § 1 of Art. II. 75 
Justice Frankfurter concluded, however, that the instances of 
past seizures the Government identified did not amount "in 
number, scope, duration or contemporaneous legal justification" 
72. Id. at 658 n.6 (Burton, 1., concurring); id. at 608 n.l6 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (noting that President had not used his authority to seize plants under the Selective 
Service Act); id. at 665-66 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he Government made 
no effort to comply with the procedures established by the Selective Service Act of 
1948 .... "). According to Marcus, the Government considered placing such orders and 
using the Selective Service Act as a basis for seizure. Because the armed forces did not 
buy steel directly but rather purchased end products containing steel, it would have been 
difficult for the Government to decide what orders to place. Marcus, Truman and the 
Steel Seizure Case at 77 (cited in note 14). 
73. Exec. Order No. 10233, 16 Fed. Reg. 3503 (1951). 
74. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 658 & nn.5, 6 (Burton, J., concurring) (noting that 
President referred controversy to the Wage Stabilization Board under the Defense Pro-
duction Act, but had not invoked the separate provisions of the Defense Production Act 
allowing condemnation); id. at 663 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Defense 
Production Act ... grants the President no power to seize real property except through 
ordinary condemnation proceedings, which were not used here .... "). 
75. Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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to the kind of unquestioned executive practice that could be 
viewed as a gloss on executive power.76 Similarly, Justice Jackson 
argued that it was important to give "to the enumerated powers 
the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, 
practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctri-
naire textualism."77 But he too rejected the notion that the his-
torical precedents the Government cited provided "color of le-
gality" for President Truman's actions.78 
As this discussion indicates, a majority of the Justices, even 
those who joined Justice Black's opinion, declined to embrace 
Justice Black's assertions that the President lacks any implied 
powers, and that courts should narrowly construe the President's 
enumerated powers.79 For Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, 
and Clark, the fact that Congress had provided procedures for 
dealing with industrial strife that were at odds with President 
Truman's actions in the case was decisive. On their reading, the 
dispute was not so much about implied presidential IJOwer as it 
was about implied and "plenary" presidential power.80 In other 
words, the question was not whether the President had the 
power to initiate a course of conduct when Congress had not 
acted, but whether that course of conduct could be sustained 
when Congress had prescribed a far different course. Justice 
Frankfurter thought it unnecessary to pass on the scope of the 
President's powers: 
The issue before us can be met, and therefore should be met, 
without attempting to define the President's powers compre-
hensively .... We must ... put to one side consideration of 
what powers the President would have had if there had been 
no legislation whatever bearing on the authority asserted by 
the seizure .... 81 
Justice Burton likewise viewed President Truman's action as dis-
tinct from steps taken when "Congress takes no action and out-
lines no governmental policy."82 Justices Burton and Clark even 
76. ld. at 613. 
77. ld. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
78. Id. at 648. 
79. See Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 216 (cited in note 14); Har-
baugh, 87 Yale L.J. at 1275 (cited in note 14); O'Donnell, 51 U. Cin. L. Rev at 98-99 
(cited in note 11). 
80. See Michael Glennon, May the President Violate Customary International Law?: 
Can the President Do No Wrong?, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 923, 924 (1986) ("Plenary power re-
fers to the power of the President to act even if Congress prohibits that act."). 
81. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
82. Id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring). 
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observed that there might be situations where an exercise of a 
presidential power not specifically enumerated could survive in 
the face of congressional opposition. Justice Burton acknowl-
edged the possibility that implied powers exist, but found them 
"unavailable" to the President in the current situation, which 
was "not comgarable to that of an imminent invasion or threat-
ened attack," while Justice Clark explicitly embraced the con-
cept of implied powers: "In my view ... the Constitution does 
grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and 
imperative national emergency. In fact, to my thinking, such a 
grant may well be necessary to the very existence of the Consti-
tution itself."84 And the three dissenting Justices were of course 
prepared to recognized an implied,85 and arguably plenary,86 
power in Youngstown itself. 
Justice Jackson's position on the subject was perhaps the 
most ambiguous, but even his opinion can be read as accepting 
that the President possesses at least some implied powers. He re-
jected the notion that the Court could declare the existence of 
"inherent" presidential powers as broad as necessary to meet 
any emergency. But in disclaiming the existence of inherent 
powers, Justice Jackson appeared to be responding to two spe-
cific claims about presidential power. The first claim, most force-
fully pressed in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 87 
was that the President's foreign affairs powers are not delegated 
by the Constitution, but are implicit in the nature of sovereignty 
and inherent in the office itself.88 The second claim was that 
powers "never expressly granted" can "accru[e] to the office [of 
the President] from the customs and claims of preceding admini-
strations."89 To accept these particular claims about presidential 
power, one must acknowledge that presidential power can derive 
83. Id. 
84. I d. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment). 
85. Id. at 667 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing conclusion of "[s]ome members 
of the Court" that "the President is without power to act in time of crisis in the absence 
of express statutory authorization"). 
86. The dissenting Justices argued that the relevant statutes did not prohibit the 
seizure. Id. at 704-07. But they also emphasized that the President should be able to take 
action in an emergency to preserve Congress's legislative prerogatives. See id. at 701. 
87. 299 u.s. 304 (1936). 
88. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J ., concurring) ("I did not suppose, and I 
am not persuaded, that history leaves it open to question, at least in the courts, that the 
executive branch, like the Federal Government as a whole, possesses only delegated 
powers."); cf. id. at 635-36 n.2 (characterizing Curtiss-Wright as among the cases reflect-
ing "the broadest recent statements of presidential power"). 
89. Id. at 646. 
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from sources other than the Constitution.90 Justice Jackson was 
not prepared to do so. But to reject these inherent power claims, 
one need not also reject the argument that the constitutional text 
and structure themselves imply the existence of powers not ex-
pressly enumerated. Indeed, Justice Jackson's recognition of a 
"zone of twilight" in which the President and Congress "may 
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncer-
tain," presupposes that the President can act in the absence of 
specific authority-and, in Justice Jackson's view, the evaluation 
of the legality of such action will likely depend "on the impera-
tives of events" rather than "abstract theories of law."91 In addi-
tion, Justice Jackson declared himself unwilling "to circumscribe, 
much less to contract, the lawful role of the President as Com-
mander in Chief,"92 a position that carries with it the suggestion 
that the President should have wide latitude to respond to for-
eign threats to the nation's security. 
In sum, although Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton 
joined Justice Black's opinion for the Court purporting to reject 
the existence of any presidential powers not delegated by Con-
gress or explicit in the Constitution's text, the question whether 
the President could claim certain "implied" powers survived the 
case. That is not to say that the concurring Justices thought the 
President possessed extraconstitutional powers-that is, inherent 
powers flowing from notions of sovereignty and not from the 
Constitution itself. They simply did not rule out the possibility 
that courts should construe the President's enumerated powers 
more broadly than Justice Black did, or that the President could 
claim powers based on the structure that the words of the Con-
stitution ordain rather than the words themselves. For the con-
curring Justices, the focus was not on whether the President 
could claim a power absent from the text, but on whether the 
90. As Justice Sutherland put it in a much-criticized passage of his opinion in Cur-
tiss-Wright: 
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers ex-
cept those specifically enumerated in the Constitution is categorically true only 
in respect of our domestic affairs .... It is important to bear in mind that we are 
here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion 
of the legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, ple-
nary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal gov-
ernment in the field of international relations .... 
299 U.S. at 315-16, 319-20. For one of many critiques of Justice Sutherland's approach, 
see Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Histori-
cal Reassessment, 83 Yale L.J. 1 (1973). 
91. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
92. Id. at 645. 
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President could claim that a nontextual power prevailed over 
Congress's opposition. 
II. THE SYMBOLIC AND RHETORICAL 
YOUNGSTOWN 
In light of the tension between Justice Black's majority 
opinion and the accompanying concurrences, the reaction of 
commentators of the day is unsurprising: One scholar, recalling 
the words of Justice Roberts in Smith v. Allwright, placed the 
decision "'in the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good 
for this day and train only."'93 If the Youngstown case stands for 
so little, then why is it viewed as a landmark case? And should it 
be? The treatment of the Youngstown case over the last fifty 
years by the courts, and particularly by the Supreme Court, pro-
vides a useful starting point for answering these questions-but 
only a starting point. Separation of powers controversies arrive 
relatively infrequently in court, and the facts of the disputes tend 
to be highly individual.94 Writing two years after the Court ren-
dered its decision in Youngstown, Professor Willard Hurst put it 
this way: "How far may the recent Steel Seizure decision have 
important limiting effects in the future, and how far may its very 
importance in its day limit its practical compulsion on events of 
another day? How significant for the future was the Dred Scott 
case except with regard to slavery?"95 That said, we can expect 
to glean something about the Youngstown case's influence on 
the development of constitutional law by examining the proposi-
tions for which the courts have relied on it. 
The Supreme Court has used Youngstown in three different 
(but overlapping) ways. First, the Court often invokes the opin-
ions of Justice Jackson and Justice Frankfurter to defend a flexi-
ble, pragmatic approach to separation of powers disputes. Sec-
ond, the Court relies on the case, and particularly on the 
93. Williams, 2 J. Pub. L. at 34 (cited in note 1) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 
u.s. 649, 669 (1944)). 
94. See Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside of the Courts, 18 
Pepperdine L. Rev. 57, 57-58 (1990) (suggesting that the Supreme Court offers "limited 
help in resolving the basic disputes of separation of power," because there are "simply 
too many conflicts over issues that are not easily addressed in court"). The Supreme 
Court has, however, demonstrated renewed interest in separation of powers controver-
sies over the last twenty-five years. See Magill, 86 Va. L. Rev. at 1133-36 (cited in note 
10) (describing "doctrinal revival" in the separation of powers field). 
95. Willard Hurst, Review and the Distribution of National Powers, in Edmond 
Cahn, ed., Supreme Court and Supreme Law 140, 147 (Simon & Schuster, 1954) (footnote 
omitted). 
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framework of Justice Jackson's concurrence, when 1t ts called 
upon to police the boundaries between executive and legislative 
authority. Because many cases in this category touch on foreign 
affairs, I defer discussion of most of them until Part III. Third, 
the Court relies on Youngstown to establish the power of the ju-
diciary to mark the boundaries of the other branches' powers, 
particularly in sensitive cases involving perceived abuses of 
power. 
I argue that it is Youngstown's appearance in this last cate-
gory of cases that accounts for its importance in our constitu-
tional system. As an example in which the judiciary reviewed 
and invalidated the action of a coordinate branch of government 
on separation of powers grounds in a sensitive factual context, 
the case will always lend weight to courts' invalidation of other 
branches' action and will stand as a deterrent to some forms of 
executive conduct. As I will suggest in Part III, however, there is 
a danger when we confuse the case's symbolic or rhetorical sig-
nificance with its doctrinal significance-with its blueprint for re-
solving disputes between the President and Congress, particu-
larly in foreign affairs. 
A. FuNCTIONAL METHODOLOGY IN SEPARATION 
OF POWERS CASES 
The Court has most frequently relied on Youngstown to de-
fend a particular methodology in separation of powers cases-
that of examining whether a disputed exercise of power disrupts 
the essential functions of another branch, rather than attempting 
to identify the precise boundaries of each branch's power. Jus-
tice Jackson's concurring opinion, echoing the views of James 
Madison,96 provided an eloquent defense of this approach: 
"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure lib-
erty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dis-
persed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its 
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but re-
ciprocity."97 The Court first invoked this language in 1974 in 
96. See, e.g., Federalist 47 (Madison) in Jacob Cooke, ed., The Federalist 312, 314 
(Random House, 1937) (principle of separation of powers does not mean that.branches 
of the government "ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each 
other"); id. No. 48, at 321 ("(U]nless (the] departments be so far connected and blended 
as to give to each a constitutional controul over the others, the degree of separation 
which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be 
duly maintained."). 
97. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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United States v. Nixon to unanimously reject former President 
Nixon's claim that the Executive possessed an absolute privilege 
against enforcement of a sub.rsoena seeking presidential commu-
nications in a criminal case. 8 To accept the claimed privilege, 
the Court reasoned, would disrupt the functioning of the judicial 
branch; a presumptive privilege, to be overcome if a court finds 
that the interest in the administration of criminal justice out-
weighs the interest in preserving confidentiality of communica-
tions, would be sufficient to "preserve[] the essential functions of 
each branch. "99 Since its decision in United States v. Nixon, the 
Court or individual Justices have invoked Justice Jackson's lan-
guage, or language of similar import in Justice Frankfurter's 
opinion, 100 to defend a functional methodology in nearly a dozen 
cases. 101 
98. 418 u.s. 683, 707 (1974). 
99. Id. 
100. 343 U.S. at 597 ('"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and 
divide fields of black and white."' (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 
209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
I 01. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (reject-
ing claim that law governing the disposition of executive materials violates separation of 
powers principles, suggesting that the Court in United States v. Nixon, relying on Justice 
Jackson's opinion in Youngstown, recognized that the proper inquiry is whether law 
"prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions"); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (analyzing executive power 
in connection with the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, quoting Justice Frank-
furter, in turn quoting Justice Holmes, to the effect that '"[t]he great ordinances of the 
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white"') (alteration in Dames 
& Moore); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,694 (1988) (rejecting claim that the Ethics in 
Government Act's independent counsel provisions violate separation of powers; holding 
that the Act does not unduly interfere with Executive Branch's functions); Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (acknowledging overlapping responsibilities 
among the branches and adopting a "flexible understanding of separation of powers"); 
id. at 408 (rejecting separation of powers challenge to Sentencing Reform Act's creation 
of the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent body in the judicial 
branch); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 751 (1996) (holding that separation of 
powers principles do not preclude Congress from delegating authority to the President to 
prescribe aggravating factors that permit courts-martial to impose the death penalty); 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 978 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court's in-
validation of legislative veto neglects the principle that "our Federal Government was 
intentionally chartered with the flexibility to respond to contemporary needs without 
losing sight of fundamental democratic principles"); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 760 
(1986) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court's invalidation of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act neglects "a fundamental principle governing consideration of disputes over 
separation of powers"- that the relevant question is whether one branch is unduly inter-
fering with the functions of another); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 267 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that§ 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
which requires federal courts to reopen final judgments in private civil actions, does not 
violate separation of powers when viewed with "(a]n appropriate regard for the mterde-
pendence of Congress and the judiciary"); Clinton v. New_ York, 524 U.S. 417, 471 
(Breyer, J. dissenting) (arguing that Supreme Court wrongly mvahdated Lme Item yeto 
Act, relying on Justice Jackson's concurrence, among other opmwns, for the proposJl!on 
2002] YOUNGSTOWN'S SHADOWS 109 
Although this category identifies the Court's most frequent 
use of the Youngstown case,102 the case's importance cannot be 
attributed solely to this use. The Court's reliance on Youngstown 
in such cases is always more rhetorical than substantive. The 
language in Justice Jackson's and Justice Frankfurter's opinions 
provides no specific guidance as to how courts should decide any 
concrete dispute. Moreover, those invoking this language gener-
ally do so to suggest that the "flexible" approach warrants up-
holding the challenged action. 103 Given the Court's invalidation 
of executive action in Youngstown, it would be ironic to con-
clude that the case's primary influence on our constitutional sys-
tem is to provide courts a means to avoid finding separation of 
powers violations. And the language in question is sufficiently 
manipulable that other Justices have at times depl'5)'ed it along-
side or in support of seemingly formal approaches. 1 
that the Court has interpreted the Constitution's structural provisions "generously in 
terms of the institutional arrangements that they permit"); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 
U.S. 681, 701 & n.35 (1997) (relying on Youngstown, among other cases, for the proposi-
tion that "the lines between the powers of the three branches are not always neatly de-
fined"); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,779 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Justice 
Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown as basis for functional interpretation in separation 
of powers cases); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-22 (1976) (per curiam) (citing Jus-
tice Jackson's argument that the Constitution contemplates integration of "dispersed 
powers into a workable government," but holding that Congress's conveyance of "wide-
ranging rulemaking and enforcement powers" to the Federal Election Commission pre-
cludes Congress, under separation of powers principles, "from vesting in itself the au-
thority to appoint those who will exercise such authority"). 
102. This category also reflects the most frequent use of Youngstown by lower 
courts. In opinions available electronically, lower courts have used the language accom-
panying note 97 in at least forty cases. In addition, the formal legal opinions of the Ex-
ecutive Branch issued by the Office of Legal Counsel frequently use Youngstown in this 
manner. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
Memorandum for the General Counsels of the Federal Government, The Constitutional 
Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 1996 WL 876050 (May 7, 
1996); Walter Dellinger, Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as 
a Treaty, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 232, 233-34 (1994); Ralph W. Terr, Scope of Con-
gressional Oversight and Investigative Power with Respect to the Executive Branch, 9 
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 60, 62 (1985); Theodore B. Olson, Confidentiality of the Attor-
ney General's Communications in Counseling the President, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 
481, 487 (1982); Statement of Theodore B. Olson, Before the Subcommittee on Rules of 
the Committee on Rules, United States House of Representatives, The Legislative Veto 
and Congressional Review of Agency Rules, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel294, 301 (1981). 
103. But see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 118-22. 
104. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721 (holding that vesting power in Congress to 
remove officer charged with execution of the laws would effectively place control of ex-
ecutive function in Congress, relying on Justice Jackson's observation that the purpose of 
dividing the powers of government was "to secure liberty"); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962, 
965-66 (Powell, J., concurring) (relying on Justice Jackson's language in recognizing that 
Constitution does not "establish three branches with precisely defined boundaries," but 
arguing that legislative veto as used in Chadha amounted to legislative usurpation of ju-
dicial function); Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Air-
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B. YOUNGSTOWN AND ABUSE OF POWER 
Courts have also drawn on Youngstown for guidance in re-
solving specific disputes over claimed executive encroachment 
on congressional prerogatives. As I will argue in connection with 
the discussion of foreign affairs, the case has proven for the 
courts a weak tool for restraining executive action. More typi-
cally, however, courts rely on Youngstown to affirm their power 
to reject another branch's interpretation of its authority in the 
separation of powers context. Some of the cases involve specific 
questions about the balance of power between the Executive 
and Congress; others do not. Since not all of these cases involve 
executive power, Youngstown's use here, like the use of the con-
curring opinions to defend a functional methodology, has a 
largely symbolic or rhetorical quality to it. The use of the case in 
this context, however, is far more significant: the Court does not 
invoke Youngstown to justify upholding challenged action under 
a generous and flexible approach to separation of powers ques-
tions, but rather as a signal that it has detected an abuse of 
power that it cannot let stand. 
Several Nixon-era cases illustrate the point. Maeva Marcus's 
chapter on the constitutional significance of the steel seizure, 
published twenty-five years after the Court decided the Youngs-
town case, chronicles courts' reliance on Youngstown to combat 
perceived abuses of power in this time period.105 In particular, 
Youngstown provided the courts with an important precedent 
for rejecting President Nixon's claims that certain actions of the 
Executive Branch were not subject to review by the judiciary.106 
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nixon is illus-
trative. As noted above, former President Nixon sought to resist 
enforcement of a subpoena seeking presidential communications 
craft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276 n.22 (1991) (relying on Justice Jackson's language in 
holding that Congress could not retain supervisory power over board to oversee control 
of District of Columbia airports). 
105. Marcus's argument is slightly broader than the one offered in the text. She ar-
gues not only that Youngstown checked abuses of power in cases involving separation of 
powers disputes, but also that Youngstown signaled the beginning of a trend of judicial 
intervention in politically charged cases, including controversies over school desegrega-
tion and reapportionment. See Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 229 (cited in 
note 14) (calling the desegregation cases "the most spectacular example of the Court's 
new willingness to face basic constitutional questions"); id. at 229-30 (arguing that 
Youngstown helped the Court to explain in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), why the 
Court could intervene in reapportionment disputes). For an argument that Marcus over-
states Youngstown's influence in such cases, see Harbaugh, 87 Yale L.J. at 1281-83 (cited 
in note 14). 
106. Sec Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 240-48 (cited in note 14). 
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by claiming that the Executive possessed an absolute J?rivilege in 
those communications, subject to no judicial review. 1 In reject-
ing that claim, the Court observed that "[n]o holding of the 
Court has defined the scope of judicial power specifically relat-
ing to the enforcement of a subpoena for confidential Presiden-
tial communications. "108 But the Court cited two instances in 
which the judiciary had invalidated another branch's exercise of 
power109 -in Youngstown with respect to executive authority, 
and in Powell v. McCormack110 with respect to legislative author-
ity. Powell, in turn, staked the Court's authority in part on 
Y oungstown. 111 The lower courts made similar use of Youngs-
town in rejecting President Nixon's assertions of privilege as well 
as his claim that the courts would lack authority to enforce any 
adverse ruling on the privilege issue. 112 And although Youngs-
town has generally proven an inconsistent restraint on executive 
conduct specifically in relation to the powers of Congress, the 
denial of the Executive's request to enjoin publication of the 
Pentagon Papers in 1971 shows Youngstown's influence.113 Three 
Justices rested their rejection of the Executive's request on the 
ground that Congress, in enacting statutes to protect national se-
curity information, had declined to authorize the President to 
seek injunctive relief. 114 Even when the Supreme Court has 
107. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,707 (1974). 
I 08. Id. at 703. 
109. Id. 
110. 395 u.s. 486 (1969). 
Ill. Id. at 549 ("Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion 
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the docu-
ment by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot 
justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility."). 
112. See Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 240-45 (cited in note 14). 
113. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
114. Id. at 740 (White, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring) ("Congress has ad-
dressed itself to the problems of protecting the security of the country and the national 
defense from unauthorized disclosure of potentially damaging information. It has not, 
however, authorized the injunctive remedy against threatened publication.") (internal 
citations omitted); id. at 743 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Congress has on several occa-
sions given extensive consideration to the problem of protecting the military and strate-
gic secrets of the United States."). 
Some scholars who focus on the distribution of congressional and presidential power 
in foreign affairs view the Pentagon Papers case as one in which members of the Court 
used overbroad language tending to support executive power. See Silverstein, Imbalance 
of Powers at 11 (cited in note 11) (noting that in the Pentagon Papers case, "even some of 
the Court's staunchest civil libertarians went out of their way to note that absent a clear 
and explicit statement from Congress denying these powers to the executive, the Court 
might well have been sympathetic to the prerogative claims advanced by the Nixon ad-
ministration"); Koh, The National Security Constitution at 137 (cited in note 11) (arguing 
that the separate opinions in the Pentagon Papers case "unveiled a strong undercurrent 
favoring the Curtiss-Wright vision of executive supremacy in foreign affairs"). As dis-
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failed to cite Youngstown in invalidating executive conduct, it is 
possible to detect how Youngstown framed the issues in the 
courts below. 115 
A more recent Clinton-era decision illustrates a similar use 
of Youngstown to establish a court's authority to act in the face 
of perceived abuses of power. In Clinton v. Jones, 116 the Court 
rejected President Clinton's claim that separation of powers 
principles required a district court to postpone, until the end of 
his presidency, civil proceedings in a dispute arising out of unof-
ficial conduct that occurred prior to his time in office. The Presi-
dent argued that permitting the proceedings to go forward would 
cause undue judicial interference with the "effective perform-
ance of his office," because of the potential for burdens on his 
time and energy. 117 In rejecting this argument, the Court ob-
served that not all "interactions between the Judicial Branch and 
the Executive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily 
rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the 
Executive's ability to perform its constitutionally mandated 
functions." 118 The fact that a court's exercise of jurisdiction may 
burden the time and attention of the President "is not sufficient 
to establish a violation of the Constitution." 119 The Court cited 
Youngstown as "the most dramatic" example of a case in which 
the judiciary had, in effect, imposed a burden on the President 
cussed in, notes 243-248 and accompanying text, however, the Pentagon Papers case was 
closely patterned on Youngstown, and the three Justices' approach was consistent with 
the approach of the concurring Justices in Youngstown. 
115. For example, in United States v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the Court considered whether the Executive 
Branch could intercept communications without judicial authorization when facing an 
alleged domestic threat to national security. The Court concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment required the Government to seck judicial authorization for the surveillance. 
Id. at 317. The case was similar to Youngstown in that the Government essentially 
claimed an implied power to protect national security in the absence of an authorizing 
statute, and indeed in the face of a federal statute that did not specifically authorize the 
Executive Branch to carry out the surveillance. ld. at 299-308 (concluding that federal 
wiretap statute neither authorized Executive to conduct surveillance in domestic security 
matters without prior judicial approval nor recognized an existing constitutional author-
ity to conduct such surveillance). The Court did not directly confront the separation of 
powers issue, essentially assuming that the President had constitutional authority to pro-
tect the United States "against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful 
means." Id. at 310. But that issue, as framed by the court below, see United States v. U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Keith), 444 F.2d 651, 660-61 (6th Cir. 
1971), may have influenced the Court's decision. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 310-11 (discussing 
past executive practice of engaging in surveillance in domestic security cases). 
116. 520 u.s. 681 (1997). 
117. ld. at 702. 
118. !d. 
119. !d. at 703. 
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by virtue of its authority to determine "whether [the President] 
has acted within the law." 120 The Court's use of Youngstown 
here, as elsewhere in the opinion, 121 is surprising, because the 
case seems far off point. Any time or burden that the President's 
involvement in the Youngstown case created arose out of his of-
ficial duties, and it is therefore difficult to view a requirement 
that he respond to legal process as a judicial interference with 
those duties.122 In invoking Youngstown throughout its opinion, 
and in emphasizing Youngstown as a precedent for courts' au-
thority to determine whether the President has acted within the 
law, the Court seemed to rely on the decision more as an illustra-
tion that the President is not above the law than for the case's 
doctrinal relevance to the dispute at hand. 
These cases suggest, as Marcus has put it, that the real sig-
nificance of the Youngstown decision "lies in the fact that it was 
made." 123 When the courts police the domain of a coordinate 
branch of government or seek to combat perceived abuse of 
power, even on questions unrelated to those the Court consid-
ered in connection with the steel seizure, it is Youngstown that 
lends the legal if not moral weight. This lesson is not lost on the 
Executive Branch, and Y oun~stown no doubt deters some ques-
tionable executive conduct. 12 As I argue in the next Part, how-
ever, the fact that this last contribution to our separation of 
powers jurisprudence is so significant, but that the case at the 
same time provides relatively little guidance on the specific con-
tours of executive power, creates a difficulty. In particular, we 
tend to assume that Youngstown's doctrinal significance for spe-
cific disputes about executive versus legislative power equals its 
rhetorical or symbolic significance in separation of powers cases 
more generally. This tendency emerges in the difficult debates 
120. ld. ("Perhaps the most dramatic example of such a case is our holding that 
President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he issued an order direct-
ing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's 
steel mills in order to avert a national catastrophe."). 
121. See id. at 696 (quoting Justice Jackson's observation that historical and schol-
arly materials concerning the Framers' intent with respect to separation of powers point 
in different directions); id. at 699 (quoting Justice Jackson's description of the power in 
the Presidency); id. at 701 & n.35 (relying on Youngstown, ar.,ong other cases, for the 
proposition that "the lines between the powers of the three branches are not always 
neatly defined"). 
122. Cf. id. at 718 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that the Youngstown 
precedent "does not seem relevant in this case"). 
123. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 228 (cited in note 14). 
124. See note 302 and accompanying text. 
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over how the Constitution allocates the power to formulate for-
eign policy and protect national security. 
III. YOUNGSTOWN IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
DEBATE 
As scholars have frequently noted, the Constitution's lim-
ited provisions on the distribution of powers in foreign affairs 
provide the political branches with an "invitation to struggle" 
over power in the area. 125 Although judicial decisions are few/ 26 
the scholarly literature is vast. 127 The weight of modern scholar-
ship takes the view that the Constitution lodges most foreign af-
fairs powers, including the power to formulate foreign policy, 
with Congress.128 Scholars who embrace this "congressional pri-
macy"129 position often argue that the Executive Branch may be 
responsible for communicating the nation's policy to foreign 
governments, but it lacks any independent authority to make 
that policy.130 They reject the view that the "executive Power" 
the Constitution confers on the President includes any powers to 
act independently of Congress. 131 Many such scholars argue that 
125. See, e.g., EdwardS. Corwin, The President 1787-1984, at 201 (Randall Bland, et 
al., eds., 5th ed. 1984); see also Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. ConstitUJion at 84 
(cited in note 11) ("[T]he Constitution is especially inarticulate in allocating foreign af-
fairs powers."); Koh, The National Security Constitution at 67 (cited in note 11) ("One 
cannot read the Constitution without being struck by its astonishing brevity regarding 
allocation of foreign affairs authority among branches."). 
126. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) ("[T]he decisions of the 
Court in this area have been rare, episodic, and afford little precedential value for subse-
quent cases."); Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution at 135 (cited in note 11) 
(noting that courts have made only "modest contributions to resolving uncertainties" 
about the distribution of powers in foreign affairs). 
127. See notes 128-145. 
128. See John Hart Ely, On Constitutional Ground 149 (Princeton U. Press, 1996) 
("The Constitution gives the President no general right to make foreign policy. Quite the 
contrary .... [V]irtually every substantive constitutional power touching on foreign af-
fairs is vested in Congress."); David Gray Adler and Larry N. George, Introduction, in 
Adler and George, eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy at 
1, 3 (cited in note 21) (describing "[t]he Framers' studied decision to vest the bulk of for-
eign policy powers in Congress"); Trimble, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. at 751 (cited in note 25) (ar-
guing that, because "Congress has virtually plenary authority over all aspects of foreign 
policy," disputes over separation of powers in this context are "mostly about influence, 
not law"). 
129. Powell, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 527 (cited in note 26). 
130. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution at 43 (cited in note 11) 
(noting that although President's status as "sole organ of official communication" with 
foreign governments has not been questioned, "issues begin to burgeon" when the Presi-
dent claims authority to determine the content of the communication). 
131. Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth 135-39 (Harvard U. 
Press, 1974) (rejecting broad construction of executive power); Koh, The National Secu-
rity Constitution at 76 (cited in note 11) (arguing that the grant of "executive Power" m-
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those foreign affairs powers that the Constitution vests exclu-
sively in the President-to serve as Commander in Chief of the 
armed forces 132 and to receive foreign ambassadors133 -should 
be narrowly interpreted. 134 Beyond that, the President possesses 
only shared powers: to negotiate treaties and appoint ambassa-
dors, both subject to the Senate's advice and consent. 135 Because 
the President's powers are limited, Congress can constrain the 
President's activities with respect to foreign affairs. Congres-
sional primacy scholars decry what they perceive to be a shift in 
power in the foreign affairs realm from Congress to the Presi-
dent over at least the last half century. 136 Such scholars often fo-
cus their criticisms on executive initiation of acts of military hos-
tility without congressional authorization, claiming that 
Congress possesses the authority not only to declare war but also 
to decide on lesser uses of military force. 137 Some also see an in-
corporales "neither an exclusive power in foreign affairs nor a general war-making 
power"); Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution at 39-40 (cited in note 11) 
(expressing doubts about broad interpretations of the executive power). 
132. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2. 
133. Id. § 3. 
134. Adler and George, Introduction, in Adler and George, eds., The Constitution 
and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy at 3 (cited in note 21) ("The Constitution 
exclusively assigns only two foreign affairs powers to the president. He is designated 
commander-in-chief of the nation's armed forces, although, as we shall see, he acts in this 
capacity by and under the authority of Congress. The president also has the power to 
receive ambassadors, but the Framers viewed this as a routine, administrative function, 
devoid of discretionary authority."); Charles A. Lofgren, On War-Making, Original In-
tent, and Ultra-Whiggery, 21 Valp. U. L. Rev. 53, 57 (1986) (arguing that ratifiers of the 
Constitution had a narrow conception of the President's power as Commander in Chief). 
135. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2. 
136. See, e.g., Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in Adler and George, 
eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy at 19 (cited in note 
21) ("The unmistakable trend toward executive domination of U.S. foreign affairs in the 
past sixty years represents a dramatic departure from the basic scheme of the Constitu-
tion."); Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers at 9 (cited in note 11) (describing emergence of 
"executive prerogative" interpretation in foreign affairs after World War II). 
137. See, e.g., Ely, On Constitutional Ground at 143 (cited in note 128) (arguing that 
Congress has "authority not simply to declare war but to decide on lesser acts of military 
hostility"); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility 3 (Princeton U. Press, 1993) ("The 
debates, and early practice, establish that ... all wars, big or small, 'declared' in so many 
words or not ... had to be legislatively authorized") (footnotes omitted); Louis Fisher, 
Presidential War Power 185 (U. Press of Kansas, 1995) ("The drift of the war power from 
Congress to the President after World War II is unmistakable. The framers' design, de-
liberately placing in Congress the decision to expend the nation's blood and treasure, has 
been radically transformed."); David Gray Adler, The Constitution and Presidential 
Warmaking, in Adler and George, eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American 
Foreign Policy at 183, 184 (cited in note 21) ("[T]he authority to initiate hostilities, short 
of and including war, is vested solely and exclusively in Congress."); see also Glennon, 
Constitutional Diplomacy at 84-86 (cited in note 23) (arguing that President's power to 
introduce armed forces into hostility in the face of congressional disapproval is "extraor-
dinarily narrow," but acknowledging independent presidential power to act in certain 
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appropriate expansion of executive authority in, among other 
things, presidential reliance on executive agreements rather than 
treaties to carry out international objectives,138 claims to a uni-
lateral power to terminate treaties,139 and claims that the Presi-
dent has the sole discretion to grant and withdraw recognition of 
foreign governments. 140 
On the other side of the debate are those who, in varying 
degrees, believe that the President has substantial authority in 
the conduct of foreign affairs and the protection of national se-
curity, including a power to formulate foreign policy. 141 Some 
such scholars locate this authority in the Constitution's grant of 
the "executive Power" to the President. 142 Others focus on the 
circumstances where Congress has not imposed limitations on his conduct); Charles A. 
Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 Yale L.J. 
672 (1972) (arguing that under original understanding of Constitution, Congress had 
dominant role in initiating hostilities, declared or not). 
138. See, e.g., Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 189-90 (cited in note 23) (sug-
gesting that President cannot enter into executive agreements on matters of national im-
portance unless they deal with a subject falling within the President's independent pow-
ers under the Constitution); Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in Adler and 
George, eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy at 29 (cited 
in note 21) (arguing that increasing use of executive agreements "constitutes a funda-
mental and extraordinary shift of power from Congress to the President") Raoul Berger, 
The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 33-48 (1972) 
(criticizing "flood" of executive agreements since 1930). 
139. See, e.g., David Gray Adler, The Constitution and the Termination of Treaties 
111-13 (Garland Publishing, 1986) (arguing that the President does not possess plenary 
power to terminate treaty, free of congressional or senatorial restraint); Glennon, Consti-
tutional Diplomacy at 156 (cited in note 23) (same); Raoul Berger, The President's Uni-
lateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 577 (1980) (same). 
140. See David Gray Adler, The President's Recognition Power, in Adler and 
George, eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy at 133, 149 
(cited in note 21) (characterizing recognition "power" as "clearly delimited by the Fram-
ers to the capacity of a narrow ministerial function"). 
141. See Powell, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 529 (cited in note 26) (arguing that the 
President possesses independent powers to formulate and pursue foreign policy); H. Jef-
ferson Powell, The Founders and the President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs, 40 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1471, 1474-75 (1999) (challenging the claim of congressional primacy 
proponents that "the constitutional thought and practice of the Founding era are devoid 
of support" for the executive primacy view); Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ram-
sey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 252 (2001) (arguing 
that "the President's executive power included a general power over foreign affairs"); see 
also Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: 
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1364, 1392 (1994) 
(arguing that President can commit U.S. forces to hostilities without specific congres-
sional authorization); Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister or Constitutional 
Monarch?, in Louis Henkin, ct a!., eds., Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 29, 30 
(Transnational Publishers, 1990) (arguing that, since the mid-1970's, "an unusually vigor-
ous and sustained congressional bid for supremacy over the Executive, stimulated by the 
Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, has threatened to convert the American Presi-
dent into a prime minister or even a benign constitutional monarch"). · 
142. See generally Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L.J. at 231 (cited in note 141). 
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President's role as "constitutional representative" of the United 
States in dealings with foreign governments, and argue that this 
role includes a hand in the development of foreign policy, not 
merely its execution.143 Moreover, from the President's authority 
as Commander in Chief, his duty to "take Care" that the laws 
are faithfully executed, 144 and the overall structure of the Consti-
tution, such scholars infer a presidential power to make decisions 
about the use of military force, not only in the case of imminent 
armed attack on the United States but also when the President 
determines that national security requires it. 145 
My purpose here is not to take sides in this debate, but 
rather to ask what the Youngstown case contributes to it. As is 
often observed, Youngstown was not a paradigmatic foreign af-
fairs case, because it concerned the President's power to order 
the seizure of domestic property.146 The arguments in Youngs-
town, however, implicated the power of the President to protect 
the country during a time of large-scale hostilities. The relevance 
of the case for congressional primacy scholars in the foreign af-
fairs area is therefore clear: the Court was reluctant to accept the 
Executive's claim that a national emergency affecting our for-
eign military commitments permitted- and indeed compelled-
action not specifically authorized by Congress. I will argue that 
even if we grant that Youngstown bears on the distribution of 
powers in matters involving foreign affairs and national security, 
the case offers fewer lessons for analyzing problems of presiden-
tial power than some scholars suggest. 
A. CONGRESSIONAL PRIMACY CHALLENGES TO 
"EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE" 
Before discussing Youngstown's bearing on disputes over 
the distribution of powers in foreign affairs, it is useful to distin-
guish between two forms of congressional primacy claims. Con-
143. Powell, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 545-59 (cited in note 26) (arguing that "the 
presidency is the institution on which the Constitution places the duty to look to the Re-
public's interests in the international arena"). 
144. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 3. 
145. Powell, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 551 (cited in note 26) ("The executive branch 
and the courts have long recognized that the President's responsibilities as constitutional 
representative of the United States in foreign affairs entail significant independent au-
thority to advance foreign policy goals and safeguard the security of the United States 
through the threat or use of military force."); id. at 564-76 (describing scope of Presi-
dent's power to protect national security). 
146. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution at 95 (cited in note 11); 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 143-44 (Houghton Mifflin, 2d ed. 
1989); Kauper, 51 Mich. L. Rev. at 175 n.99, 182 (cited in note 3). 
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gressional primacy scholars are united in their rejection of an 
"executive prerogative" or "prerogative power" in foreign af-
fairs, but they seem to differ in their assessments of precisely 
what that means and therefore approach separation of powers 
questions differently. 147 The distinctions are important, because 
they bear on the residuum of presidential power, if any, that 
such scholars are willing to recognize. 
Virtually all congressional primacy scholars reject claims 
that the Executive possesses significant "plenary" powers in for-
eign affairs-that is, powers that cannot be regulated or limited 
by Congress. 148 We can identify two different strands of the con-
gressional primacy position on plenary power. First is an argu-
ment that the Executive lacks the power in question, let alone a 
plenary one. When an assertion of presidential power is based 
on the constitutional text-for example, when the President 
claims authority to initiate military hostilities by virtue of his 
power as Commander in Chief, or when the President claims 
that the power to receive foreign ambassadors entails a power to 
determine the conditions under which the United States recog-
nizes a foreign government-many congressional primacy schol-
ars argue that the Executive Branch has too broadly construed 
the text. 149 Similarly, if the Executive claims that a particular 
power can be inferred from a single constitutional provision, a 
collection of constitutional provisions, or the structure of the 
Constitution, some congressional ~rimacy scholars argue that the 
power in question does not exist. 1 0 In arguing that the President 
lacks a particular power, congressional primacy scholars who 
take this approach need not necessarily identify a specific power 
delegated to Congress that displaces the presidential power, or 
147. John Locke included the "prerogative" power in his taxonomy of executive 
power. Sec John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 159-68, at 83-88 (Barnes & 
Noble, C.B. Mcpherson, ed., 1980) (1690). Even in Locke's formulation, the term could 
mean one of two things: the power to act in the public interest without statutory author-
ity, or the power to act in the public interest in disregard of the law. ld. § 160, at 84 ("This 
power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the 
law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative . ... ). 
148. See, e.g., Koh, The National Security Constitution at 72, 108 (cited in note 11) 
(arguing that the Constitution's structure and text call for "balanced institutional partici-
pation" in the national security process, and that outside of a narrow pocket of exclusive 
executive authority, "Congress must have an opportunity to participate in the setting of 
broad foreign policy objectives"). 
149. See, e.g., Adler and George, Introduction, in The Constitution and the Conduct 
of American Foreign Policy at 3 (cited in note 21) (arguing for narrow construction of 
Commander in Chief power and power to receive ambassadors). 
150. See id. at 1-2 (describing and criticizing executive primacy claims that certain 
executive powers flow from President's place in constitutional structure). 
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Congress's exercise of such a power. Rather, congressional pri-
macy scholars who take this approach reject the notion that it is 
possible to identify significant presidential foreign affairs pow-
ers, either embraced within the President's enumerated powers 
or inferred from the constitutional text and structure. Scholars 
who take this view would presumably treat claims to nontextual 
presidential powers as claims of "executive prerogative" and re-
ject them, even when those claims were not accompanied by a 
further argument that Congress cannot regulate the nontextual 
presidential power. 151 
The second congressional primacy argument is narrower. 
The argument is not that the Constitution withholds any signifi-
cant foreign affairs powers from the President, but that, with few 
exceptions, the President's powers are not "plenary." Under this 
approach, it is not necessary to argue that the Executive lacks 
any implied powers in foreign affairs. Rather, this position de-
pends on establishing that the Constitution affords Congress a 
greater role, and that in most circumstances Congress's will 
should prevail. In other words, the target of some congressional 
primacy scholars is not so much the general claim that certain 
presidential powers can be inferred from the constitutional text 
and structure, but the further claim that Congress cannot regu-
late or limit the President's exercise of these powers. Under this 
theory, Congress has a pivotal role to play in foreign affairs mat-
ters should it choose to assert it. 152 The Executive generally can-
not act contrary to Congress's will or claim to withhold informa-
tion from Congress that might influence Congress in its decision 
to act. 153 Some scholars who take this approach in fact explicitly 
151. Adler and George, Introduction, in The Constitution and the Conduct of Ameri-
can Foreign Policy at 5 (cited in note 21) (criticizing the "mushrooming cloud of unilat-
eral presidential actions in contravention of the Constitution" that overshadows the 
Framers' blueprint for foreign affairs); Donald L. Robinson, Presidential Prerogative and 
the Spirit of American Constitutionalism, in Adler and George, The Constitution and the 
Conduct of American Foreign Policy 114, 114 (cited in note 21) (characterizing "preroga-
tive" as the "president's authority to act on behalf of the United States in the absence of 
law, or in defiance of it") (emphasis added). 
152. Koh, The National Security Constitution at 108 (cited in note 11) (arguing that 
Congress must have an "opportunity to participate" in the foreign policy process); 
Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers at 8 (cited in note 11) (describing the traditional under-
standing of foreign policy as one in which "Congress had a legitimate role to play should 
it choose to assert that role"). 
. 153. See, e.g., Koh, The National Security Constitution at 113 (cited in note 11) (argu-
mg that balanced institutional participation in the foreign policy making process requires 
that President and Congress share information); Louis Fisher, The Role of Congress in 
Foreign Policy, 11 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 153, 160-61 (criticizing presidential withhold-
ing of documents relevant to Congress's exercise of its constitutional powers, such as the 
power to regulate commerce); cf. Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Presidential Pillar 
120 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:87 
recognize that the Executive has certain unenurnerated "concur-
rent"154 or "initiating"155 powers to act, and that the Executive's 
conduct will stand so long as Congress is silent. 156 
The links between the Youngstown case and the approaches 
of these two groups of congressional primacy scholars157 are 
Without Constitutional Support, 26 Viii. L. Rev. 405, 405 (1980-81) (arguing that "Con-
gress and the President are partners in government," and "[i)t offends common sense to 
maintain that one partner may conceal information from the other in the alleged interest 
of the partnership"); Raoul Berger, War, Foreign Affairs, and Executive Secrecy, 72 Nw. 
L. Rev. 309, 334-43 (1977) (arguing that President lacks power to withhold information 
from Congress). 
154. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution at 92 (cited in note 11), Koh, 
The National Security Constitution at 109 (cited in note 11). 
155. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 15 (cited in note 23). 
156. Id. at 15-16 ("The Constitution sometimes appears silent with respect to issues 
of decision-making authority. In such circumstances, concurrent power is said to exist in 
both political branches .... The President's initiatives here are contingently constitu-
tional; their validity depends upon congressional inaction."); Henkin, Foreign Affairs and 
the U.S. Constitution at 36 (cited in note 11) ("Except where the Constitution expressly 
allocates power to Congress and implies that it is exclusive of the President, there is in-
creasingly less disposition to deny the President power to act where Congress has not yet 
acted."); Trimble, 83 Am. 1. Int'l L. at 757 (cited in note 25) ("Presidential exercise of 
power is always subject to ex post facto review by Congress to weigh both the genuine-
ness of the urgency and the wisdom of the action. If Congress disagrees, it can repudiate 
the President formally. Congressional action in response to assertions of presidential pre-
rogative in these contexts should in tum trump the presidential power .... "); see also 
Chemerinsky, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 874-76 (cited in note 25) (noting cases in which "the 
Court has implicitly adopted a framework whereby the President may take any action 
not expressly prohibited by the Constitution or statute"). 
157. In focusing on these two types of congressional primacy argument, I leave to 
one side two other claims that often appear in commentary on the balance of powers be-
tween Congress and the President in foreign affairs. The first relates to perceived argu-
ments that the President possesses powers inherent in sovereignty and not stemming 
from the Constitution or constrained by it. Shades of this claim appear in dictum in Jus-
tice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 
which suggested that the conduct of foreign relations was by its nature executive and ex-
isted prior to and independently of the Constitution. 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936); see 
notes 87-90 and accompanying text. Congressional primacy scholars often treat claims of 
"implied" presidential power as claims of inherent, extraconstitutional presidential 
power. See, e.g., Adler and George, Introduction, in The Constitution and the Conduct of 
American Foreign Policy at 2 (cited in note 21) (characterizing argument for presidential 
dominance in foreign affairs as depending on claims that President's authority in foreign 
relations is "unfettered," that he "is vested with certain 'inherent powers' and all of the 
executive power of the nation," and that he "possesses authority to violate the law"); 
Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in Adler and George, eds., The Constitu-
tion and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy at 25 (cited in note 21) (arguing that 
Curtiss- Wright "has provided a common thread in a pattern of cases that has exalted 
presidential power above constitutional norms"). For those who believe that the Presi-
dent possesses no implied powers, of course, actions not tied to an explicit textual grant 
are by definition extraconstitutional. Moreover, such scholars no doubt vtew at least 
some invocations of the implied power nomenclature as attempts to cloak otherwtse un-
constitutional activity with constitutional legitimacy. The point for our purposes is that a 
theory rejecting inherent, extraconstitutional powers is not of its own force sufficient to 
dismiss serious claims about implied presidential power in foreign affairs and national 
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readily apparent. Those who reject the existence of any implied 
executive powers in foreign affairs, except possibly the power to 
respond to an armed attack on the United States, treat the 
Court's ruling against President Truman as a rejection of any 
broad interpretation of "executive Power" and of the concept of 
implied powers. For those who reject claims that certain presi-
dential powers, if they exist, are "plenary"- in the sense of being 
incapable of congressional limitation- the result of the case is 
less important than Justice Jackson's framework for evaluating 
presidential action. As I will argue, however, Youngstown pro-
vides less support for either of these congressional primacy posi-
tions than their advocates believe. 
B. YOUNGSTOWN AND EXECUTIVE POWER CLAIMS 
As the earlier discussion of the Youngstown decision sug-
gests, the case provides less support for the proposition that the 
President lacks any significant constitutional foreign affairs pow-
ers than its proponents claim.158 Although Justice Black's opin-
ion for the Court narrowly interpreted the President's enumer-
ated powers and purported to reject implied powers, his 
reasoning differed substantially from the reasoning of Justices 
who joined his opinion. For the concurring Justices, the case was 
not an implied power case at all; it was a plenary power case. 
Most of the concurring Justices declined to pass on the scope of 
presidential powers, thus leaving the implied powers question 
open; some even suggested that the President does possess some 
plenary powers-a conclusion that, in context, necessarily de-
pended on recognition of at least some implied powers. 159 And 
Justice Jackson's categorization of executive action, including a 
range in which congressional inaction might "invite" independ-
ent presidential action, necessarily presupposed that the Execu-
security matters. 
Second, some scholars argue not only that the Executive Branch claims constitu-
tional powers that do not exist, but also that Congress has by statute delegated too much 
of its own constitutional authority to the President. See Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers 
at 185-86 (cited in note 11) (considering whether separation of powers principles limit 
what foreign affairs powers Congress may constitutionally delegate to the President). 
Because the Supreme Court has not used the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a stat-
ute since 1935, this argument is largely prudential rather than constitutional under cur-
rent doctrine. I therefore consider only whether it provides a normative basis for nar-
rowly construing statutory foreign affairs delegations. See note 218 and accompanying 
text. 
158. See notes 79-90 and accompanying text. 
159. See notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
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tive could act without express constitutional or congressional 
delegation. 160 
In other words, Youngstown tells us very little about the 
scope of presidential power. At most, the case forecloses the 
claim that it is possible to identify presidential foreign affairs 
powers that are inherent in sovereignty, not created or con-
strained by the Constitution. And without Youngstown, congres-
sional primacy scholars who urge a narrow construction of the 
President's enumerated powers and who reject the existence of 
implied powers can draw on little judicial support, for the courts' 
pronouncements on the distribution of power between Congress 
and the President in foreign affairs tend to favor the President. 161 
Congressional primacy scholars explain such pronouncements 
away, as the product of judicial inattention or judicial suscepti-
bility to executive claims that intervention will upset carefully 
balanced international policies.162 The point here is not that a 
congressional primacy position that rests on Youngstown col-
lapses, but that its defense must proceed from nonjudicial 
sources (and, indeed, in the face of most judicial pronounce-
ments).163 
Proponents of the view do offer several alternative sources 
of support for the argument that the President lacks significant 
powers to formulate and carry out foreign policy. First, they 
point to the textual commitment of several important foreign af-
fairs powers to Congress164 -most notably, the power to declare 
160. 343 U.S. at 640-41 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
161. Apart from the Court's controversial statements in Curtiss-Wright, consider Sale 
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,188 (1993); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
812 n.l9 (1982); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 
n.18 (1976); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960); Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339 
U.S. 763, 789 (1950); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 
U.S. 103, 109 (1948); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605-06 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 
U.S. 759, 767 (1972) (plurality opinion); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713,728-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
162. See, e.g., Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in Adler and George, 
eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy at 44 (cited in note 
21) (discussing Court's "reflexive use of law to legitimate the international politics of the 
President"); see also Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 
Am. J. Int'l L. 805, 806 (1989) (suggesting that "[p]ragmatic concerns about the effective 
execution of U.S. foreign policy ... have led courts to accord great respect to the execu-
tive branch's positions."). 
163. See Powell, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 1473 (cited in note 141) (noting "sheer 
weight of inconvenient judicial comment" that congressional primacy scholars must dis-
miss). 
164. See Adler and George, Introduction, in The Constitution and the Conduct of 
American Foreign Policy at 3 (cited in note 21) ("Article I vests in Congress broad, ex-
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war,165 the power to regulate foreign commerce,166 and the Sen-
ate's powers to give its advice and consent to treaties and ap-
pointments.167 Second, they highlight incidents from the time of 
the Constitution's founding revealing, they argue, that the Fram-
ers did not believe that the President possessed an independent 
power to make foreign policy. 168 
I do not intend to suggest that these sources are unpersua-
sive or that a congressional primacy view is incorrect. But the 
matter is considerably more complex than those who would re-
ject significant presidential foreign affairs powers out of hand 
suggest. The text alone cannot resolve the issue, because presi-
dential and congressional powers could be interpreted broadly 
or narrowly. For example, the text alone does not indicate 
whether the "executive Power" includes a general foreign affairs 
authority,169 or whether the Commander in Chief power entails a 
power to decide when to introduce U.S. forces into hostility. The 
allocation to Congress of the power to "declare War" does not 
necessarily resolve the matter, because it does not indicate 
where the Constitution places the power to initiate hostilities 
short of war. 170 As I will discuss below, others have argued that 
the congressional primacy view depends as much on inferences 
from the constitutional text and structure as the executive pri-
macy view.171 And, as in many other contexts, the accounts of 
plicit, and exclusive powers .... ") 
165. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 11. 
166. Id. cl. 3. 
167. Id. Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
168. See, e.g., Koh, The National Security Constitution at 90 (cited in note 11) 
("None of these [early] Presidents ever claimed that he possessed inherent constitutional 
powers as chief executive or commander in chief that lay beyond legislative control"); 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Introduction, in Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitu-
tional Power: The Origins at xvii-xx (cited in note 11). For discussion of the historical 
precedents, see generally Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The 
Origins (cited in note 11). 
169. For an argument that "executive Power" does include a general foreign affairs 
authority, see generally Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L.J. at 252-53 (cited in note 142). 
170. See Bobbitt, 92 Mich. L. Rev. at 1365 (cited in note141) (noting that "the power 
to make war is not an enumerated power"). Some congressional primary scholars rely on 
Congress's power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," U.S. Cons!., Art. I, § 8, ci. 
11, to argue that the Constitution vested all powers to initiate hostilities in Congress. See, 
e.g., Ely, War and Responsibility at 3 (cited in note 137); Fisher, Presidential War Power 
at 2-3 (cited in note 137); Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution, 81 Yale L.J. at 
695 (cited in note 137). 
171. See Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L.J. at 236-37 (cited in note 142) ("A com-
mon tenet of scholars who agree on little else is that once one moves beyond the war and 
treaty-making powers, the Constitution itself has little to say about the relative roles of 
the President and Congress, but rather contains substantial gaps that compel resort to 
other considerations."); id. at 241 (noting that congressional primacy scholars rely on 
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original understanding and early constitutional practice are dis-
puted.172 More important, such accounts are deployed not only 
by congressional primacy scholars who reject virtually all signifi-
cant presidential powers in foreign affairs, but also by congres-
sional primacy scholars who embrace some implied powers-in 
the form of initiating or concurrent authority-but decline to 
treat them as plenary. The point for now is that the questions 
about the scope of presidential foreign affairs powers are not 
easily resolved, and Youngstown contributes little to the analysis. 
Youngstown offers no general theory of the scope of the Presi-
dent's constitutional powers. 
C. JUSTICE JACKSON'S CONCURRENCE AND THE 
ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
For scholars who object to assertions of "plenary" powers in 
foreign affairs, without necessarily rejecting the theory that sig-
nificant presidential powers can be inferred from the Constitu-
tion's text and structure, the majority opinion in Youngstown is 
less important than the reinforcement of the congressional pri-
macy position found in Justice Jackson's concurrence. Such 
scholars interpret Justice Jackson's framework to suggest that 
Congress can displace most executive action that it disa9rees 
with- that there are few truly plenary presidential powers. 73 If 
this congressional supremacy model is the appropriate one, then 
it follows that the courts' main task is to assess Congress's intent. 
Careful adherence to the lines between Justice Jackson's catego-
ries, these scholars argue, will help preserve the balance of 
power between Congress and the President; failure to police the 
boundaries will allow congressional objection to be taken for 
congressional silence or congressional silence to be taken for 
congressional approval, watering down the appropriate level of 
scrutiny for the Executive's conduct. Commentators :::harge that 
courts have failed to adhere to the boundaries between Justice 
sources other than the constitutional text to explain Congress's foreign affairs powers). 
172. Compare, e.g., Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
29, 36-69 (1972); Ely, War and Responsibility at 3-9 (cited in note 137); Fisher, Presiden· 
tial War Power at 1-12 (cited in note 137); and Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitu-
tion, 81 Yale L.J. at 677-99 (cited in note 137) with Bobbitt, 92 Mich. L. Rev. at 1370-88 
(cited in note 141); Powell, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 1476-1533 (cited in note 141); and 
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding 
of War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 170-75 (1996). 
173. See Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 13 (cited in note 23) (arguing that 
"the record is a sobering one for anyone arguing that a subject falls within the President's 
exclusive constitutional domain"). 
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Jackson's categories.174 As I will argue, however, Justice Jack-
son's concurring opinion does not contain many of the limiting 
principles that scholars ascribe to it. 
In analyzing judicial approaches to questions about foreign 
affairs, it is useful to distinguish two types of cases: cases in 
which courts construe a specific delegation of authority from 
Congress to determine whether the delegation encompasses the 
challenged executive conduct, and cases in which such a delega-
tion is absent. In the first category of cases, scholars implicitly 
assume that Justice Jackson's concurrence requires courts to 
construe congressional delegations in the foreign affairs context 
narrowly, and they criticize courts for failing to do so. 175 This cri-
tique is often made without comparing courts' construction of 
foreign affairs delegations with their construction of domestic 
delegations. Although there are important differences in ap-
proach, the suggestion that courts should construe foreign affairs 
delegations more narrowly than domestic delegations depends 
on normative judgments to which the Youngstown framework 
does not speak. In the second category of cases, scholars implic-
itly assume that Justice Jackson's approach forecloses any find-
ing of congressional "approval" of executive conduct when the 
President cannot point to a statute delegating specific authority. 
The concurring opinions in Youngstown, including Justice Jack-
son's, in fact rely heavily on inferences from the legislative land-
scape, and it is not readily apparent why such inferences cannot 
give rise to a finding of congressional approval. 
If we step back from Justice Jackson's framework, it be-
comes clear that ordinary delegation principles should govern 
judicial assessment of Congress's authorization of executive con-
duct. Beyond that, the relevant questions are ones about the 
scope of the President's constitutional powers. Courts tend to 
avoid these questions by resolving cases on dubious statutory 
grounds or by deeming disputes over the scope of presidential 
power to be political questions. The narrow role courts take in 
these cases is in some ways consistent with the role Justice Jack-
son expected courts to play in cases where Congress is silent with 
respect to a particular executive initiative. As I will suggest, 
however, this approach has significant costs. 
174. See note 12 and accompanying text. 
175. See note 21 and accompanying text. 
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1. Construing Congressional Delegations 
Under Justice Jackson's framework for evaluating executive 
conduct, a court's task is to determine whether the President is 
acting in "disjunction or conjunction" with the will of Con-
gress.176 Where the Executive rests its action on a specific stat-
ute, the court must construe the statute to determine if it author-
izes the conduct in question. Debates over foreign affairs powers 
are often debates over whether courts should broadly or nar-
rowly construe statutory delegations. The Supreme Court has 
dealt with the same statutes in a variety of ways, and the differ-
ences cannot be explained solely by shifts over time in the 
Court's approach to delegation questions. 177 Rather than illus-
trating the courts' failure to be faithful to Justice Jackson's 
framework, however, the cases illustrate the inherent ambigui-
ties in that framework. Viewed through the lens of Justice Jack-
son's concurrence, the variations in the Court's approach high-
light the impossibility of identifying Congress's "implied" will. 
a. The Passport Cases 
Three cases addressing the authority of the Executive 
Branch to withhold or revoke passports illustrate the difficulty. 
In Kent v. Dulles,178 the Court considered a challenge by two 
U.S. citizens to the Secretary of State's denial of passports neces-
sary for foreign travel. Both citizens had declined to execute af-
fidavits, required under regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary of State, stating whether they were or ever had been 
members of the Communist Party. 179 They argued that the Secre-
tary of State lacked the authority to require such an affidavit as a 
condition of granting a passport. Congress had first specifically 
required passports for foreign travel in 1952.180 The issuance of 
passports, however, remained controlled by a 1926 statute au-
thorizing the Secretary of State to "grant and issue passports ... 
under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe 
176. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
177. For a general discussion of deference to the Executive in foreign affairs matters, 
see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649, 663 
(2000) (observing that courts' approach in foreign affairs cases "seems more deferential 
to the Executive, on average, than the approach in cases conventionally labeled as 'do-
mestic' in nature"). 
178. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
179. ld. at 118, 119. 
180. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 190 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1185 (1994)). 
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for and on behalf of the United States."181 The President had in 
turn delegated his authority to prescribe certain rules to the Sec-
retary of State.182 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas con-
cluded that, in leaving the issuance of passports in the hands of 
the Secretary of State, Congress did not intend for the Secretary 
to have unfettered discretion "to grant or withhold a passgort 
from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose."1 In 
defending the regulation, the Executive urged the Court to hold 
that Congress had impliedly adopted the Executive's longstand-
ing interpretation that it had broad, if not unlimited, discretion 
to withhold passports. 184 Analyzing the executive practice in 
question, however, the Court found that the Secretary of State 
had withheld passports in the past only in two types of cases-
those involving questions about an applicant's citizenship or al-
legiance to the United States and those involving questions 
about an applicant's illegal conduct. Because there was no sub-
stantial, consistent practice of denying passports on grounds re-
lated to political association, the Court would not infer that 
Coniress had adopted the Executive's interpretation of the stat-
ute.1 5 In light of the fact that the Secretary's action implicated a 
liberty interest-the right to travel freely-the Court would not 
construe the statute to grant the Executive unbridled discretion 
to limit that right absent a clear statement to that effect. 186 Citing 
Youngstown, the Court concluded that if a citizen's right to 
travel is to be regulated, "it must be pursuant to the lawmaking 
functions of Congress." 187 The Court thus relied on Youngstown 
to adopt a narrow construction of a statutory delegation impli-
181. Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 772, 44 Stat. 887 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 
211a (1994)). 
182. See Exec. Order No. 7856, par. 126, 3 Fed. Reg. 681, 687 (1938) (authorizing 
Secretary of State "to make regulations on the subject of issuing, renewing, extending, 
amending, restricting, or withdrawing passports additional to these rules and not incon-
sistent therewith"); see 5 U.S.C. § 156 (1958) (redesignated as 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (1994)) 
(requiring Secretary of State to perform foreign affairs related duties assigned by the 
President). 
183. Kent, 357 U.S. at 128. 
184. Id. at 125. 
185. Id. at 128 ("We, therefore, hesitate to impute to Congress, when in 1952 it made 
a passport necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secre-
tary of State, a purpose to give him unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport 
from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose."). 
186. Id. at 129 ("Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the 
well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly 
all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them. We hesitate to find in this broad general-
ized power an authority to trench so heavily on the rights of the citizen.") (citations omit-
ted). 
187. Id. at 129. 
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eating a fundamental right, and also to foreclose the existence of 
an imolied executive power to control the issuance of pass-
ports.1~a8 
Seven years later, in Zemel v. Rusk, the Court construed the 
same 1926 statute to authorize the Secretary of State to refuse to 
validate passports for travel to Cuba.189 The Court found in the 
statute's legislative history no affirmative intention to authorize 
area restrictions, but also no intent to exclude such restrictions-
factors that took on "added significance" in light of the Secretary 
of State's imposition of area restrictions both before and after 
passage of the 1926 and 1952 Acts. 190 In other words, the Court 
found it appropriate to attribute to Congress the Executive's 
own construction of the statute. The Court distinguished Kent by 
suggesting that the Executive's practice with respect to area re-
strictions was more substantial than its practice with respect to 
questions about political affiliations.191 But there was a key dif-
ference in the Court's approach in the two cases. In Kent, the 
Court had focused on the fact that the Secretary of State's action 
might infringe upon a protected right to travel. As a result, the 
Court narrowly construed the delegated power. In Zemel, the 
Court analyzed whether Congress had acquiesced in the Execu-
tive's gractice before turning to the nature of the right impli-
cated. 2 The result was a standard that favored the Executive. 
Once the Court found congressional acquiescence, the citizen's 
right to travel was regulated pursuant to an act of Congress-
precisely what Kent would have required. In other words, while 
purporting to follow Kent, the Zemel Court did not narrowly 
construe the delegation or require a clear statement from Con-
gress. 
The Court's 1981 decision in Haig v. Agee,193 again constru-
ing the delegation in the 1926 Passport Act, went one step be-
yond Zemel. The case concerned whether the Secretary of State 
could revoke a passport for security reasons. Although the Ex-
ecutive Branch could not identify a substantial practice of revok-
188. See id. 
189. 381 u.s. 1, 7 (1965). 
190. Id. at 8; see id. at 8-13 (describing area restrictions). 
191. Id. at 12-13. 
192. See id. at 13 ("Having concluded that the Secretary of State's refusal to validate 
appellant's passport for travel to Cuba is supported by the authority granted by Congress 
in the Passport Act of 1926, we must next consider whether that refusal abridges any con-
stitutional right of appellant."). 
193. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
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ing passports,194 the Executive Branch had issued a regulation 
setting forth circumstances in which it would do so. 195 The Court 
imputed knowledge of the executive policy to Congress, even in 
the absence of any strong evidence that Congress was aware of 
it. Based on Congress's failure to disturb the policy when it con-
sidered statutes in related areas, the Court concluded that Con-
gress had implicitly approved the policy.196 In other words, the 
finding of congressional acquiescence in the Executive's con-
struction of the delegation no longer depended on the existence 
of any substantial and consistent past practice. 197 The result was 
a standard even more deferential to the Executive Branch than 
the one applied in Zemel. 
b. Foreign versus Domestic Delegations 
The passport cases illustrate two undercurrents in the 
court's treatment of delegation in the foreign affairs context. 
First, questions about the scope of a congressional delegation 
and the scope of the President's constitutional powers in foreign 
affairs are closely intertwined. In Kent, the Court rejected the 
Executive's claim that the Passport Act authorized it to withhold 
a passport on grounds of political association. The majority did 
not then proceed to consider whether the President could claim 
an implied authority to withhold a passport, believing that 
Youngstown foreclosed that conclusion.198 The four dissenting 
Justices-including two who concurred in the Youngstown deci-
sion, Justices Clark and Burton-disagreed with the Court's con-
struction of the statute, but apparently also with its conclusion 
that the Secretary of State's discretion necessarily depended 
upon the statute. They observed that "all during our history" the 
Secretary of State "has had discretion to grant or withhold pass-
ports," and that this power was "first exercised without the bene-
fit of statute. "199 In Zemel, where the Court approved the Secre-
tary of State's practice of imposing area restrictions, the 
dissenting Justices believed that the absence of specific congres-
sional intent to authorize area restrictions meant that the Secre-
194. ld. at 302. 
195. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1980). 
196. 453 U.S. at 303. 
197. Id. ("The Secretary has construed and applied his regulations consistently and it 
would be anomalous to fault the Government because there were so few occasions to 
exercise the announced policy in practice."). 
198. 357 U.S. at 129. 
199. Id. at 131. 
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tary of State's action rested on a claim of inherent authority with 
respect to issuance of pas~orts, and in their view Youngstown 
foreclosed that argument.2 
Second, in construing foreign affairs delegations, the Su-
preme Court has departed in three ways from its ordinary ap-
proach to construing statutes granting authority to the Execu-
tive. First, the Court has invoked a special principle of deference 
to executive action in foreign affairs even when ordinary defer-
ence to an executive construction of a statute would suffice to 
decide the case. In Agee, for example, the Court acknowledged 
that courts generally must defer to a consistent administrative 
construction of a statute, but stated, relying on Curtiss-Wright, 
that the case for deference is even stronger in the foreign affairs 
context.201 Even though the Court's modern approach to delega-
tion issues affords great latitude to the Executive Branch-
requiring a court to defer to a reasonable executive construction 
of a statute when Congress does not speak directly to the is-
sue202- the Court continues to use the Agee approach in cases 
200. 381 U.S. at 20-21 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I cannot accept the Government's ar-
gument that the President has 'inherent' power to make regulations governing the issu-
ance and use of passports. We emphatically and I think properly rejected a similar argu-
ment advanced to support a seizure of the Nation's steel companies by the President."); 
id. at 28 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that the Executive has inherent au-
thority to impose area restrictions in time of peace."); id. at 30 ("I would rule here, as this 
Court did in Kent v. Dulles, that passport restrictions may be imposed only when Con-
gress makes provision therefor 'in explicit terms' consistent with constitutional guaran-
tees." (quoting Kent, 357 U.S. at 130; citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 613)). 
201. 453 U.S. at 291 ("[A) consistent administrative construction of [a] statute must 
be followed by the courts unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong. This is 
especially so in areas of foreign policy and national security, where congressional silence 
is not to be equated with congressional disapproval.") (citations and internal quotation, 
omitted). 
202. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counci~ Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). Chevron deference applies when Congress charges an agency with admini-
stration of a federal statute. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990). There 
arc several open questions about what sorts of administrative actions qualify for Chevron 
deference. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2175 (2001) (declining 
to apply Chevron deference to letter rulings issued by U.S. Customs Service); Thomas W. 
Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 840-52 (2001) (de-
scribing open questions regarding Chevron's application); Robert A. Anthony, Which 
Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 Yale J. Reg. 1 (1990) 
(analyzing whether Chevron should apply to various categories of agency action). Chev-
ron deference would apply, however, to the sorts of formal rules at issue in the foreign 
affairs cases described thus far. Each case involved a regulation issued under delegated 
authority to promulgate rules with the force of law. The three passport cases each in-
volved the 1926 statute granting the Secretary of State authority to issue passports "un-
der such rules as the President shall designate." The President in tum delegated his au-
thority to prescribe rules to the Secretary of State. Exec. Order No. 78?6, par. 126, 3 ~ed. 
Reg. 681, 687 (1938) (authorizing Secretary of State "to make regulations on the subJeCt 
of issuing, renewing, extending, amending, restricting, or withdrawing passports add1-
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involving foreign affairs delegations.203 Second, in foreign affairs 
cases the Court has gone beyond deferring to the Executive's 
construction of a statute, taking the additional step of imputing 
the construction back to Congress. In Agee, the Court not only 
itself adopted the Executive's construction of a statute, it found 
that Congress had done so-that Congress's failure to reject the 
Executive's construction amounted to acquiescence in or ap-
proval of that construction. The deference ordinarily afforded 
the Executive Branch in its construction of statutes, from the 
seminal case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense CounciP04 forward, is not based on a theory of congres-
sional acquiescence or approval of a particular executive reading 
of a statute. Rather, it flows from courts' construction of Con-
gress's likely intent in delegating power in the first place.205 If 
Congress has left a gap in a statutory scheme, a court will pre-
sume that Congress intended the Executive to fill the gap.20 In-
stead of concluding that Congress acquiesced in or approved of 
the executive reading of the statute, the Agee Court clearly could 
have sustained the Executive Branch's action on the theory that 
Congress had explicitly granted the Executive Branch discretion 
in formulating rules regulating the use of passports. The statute, 
after all, authorized the Secretary of State to grant passports 
"under such rules as the President shall designate and pre-
scribe."207 Even though the result in the Agee case would have 
tiona! to these rules and not inconsistent therewith"); see 5 U.S.C. § 156 (1958) (redesig-
nated as 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (1994)) (requiring Secretary of State to perform foreign affairs 
related duties assigned by the President). In each case, the Secretary of State imposed the 
relevant limitation by regulation or by regulation and public notice. See 17 Fed. Reg. 
8013 (1952) (regulation at issue in Agee); 26 Fed. Reg. 482, 492 (1961) (regulation and 
public notice at issue in Zemel); 31 Fed. Reg. 13537, 13544 (1%6) (regulation at issue in 
Agee). Chevron deference would also apply to the Treasury regulations at issue in Regan 
v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), which I discuss below, see notes 203, 228. See 47 Fed. Reg. 
17030 (1982) (regulation at issue in Wald). 
203. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222,243 (1984) (sustaining travel restriction in 
part based on "traditional deference to executive judgment" in foreign affairs). For an 
argument that courts have departed from ordinary principles of statutory construction in 
cases involving international environmental statutes, see David M. Driesen, The Con-
gressional Role in International Environmental Law and its Implications for Statutory In-
terpretation, 18 Envt'l Aff. 287,289-90,309-11 (1991). 
204. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
205. See Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo. L.J. at 863-73 (cited in note 202) (assessing 
possible legal foundations for the Chevron doctrine and concluding that the doctrine is 
best explained as resting on a presumption of congressional intent); cf. Bradley, 86 Va. L. 
Rev. at 671 (cited in note 177) (arguing that Chevron "is not based, at least not strongly, 
on congressional intent. Instead, it is based partly on the Court's sense of what Congress 
would have wanted if it had thought about the issue."). 
206. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
207. Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 772, 44 Stat. 887 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 
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been the same under either approach, it is not difficult to imag-
ine a court elevating a finding of acquiescence or approval over 
indications of contrary congressional intent and thereby sustain-
ing under the Agee approach an executive policy that would not 
survive under Chevron.208 Agee, of course, predated Chevron by 
three Terms, but the concept of judicial deference to agency 
construction of a statute was not a new one.209 Finally, the Court 
has treated foreign affairs delegations differently from purely 
domestic delegations with respect to Executive constructions 
that raise constitutional questions. In cases involving purely do-
mestic delegations, the Court has at times stated that Chevron 
deference must give way when the Executive's construction of a 
regulation raises a serious constitutional question.210 The pass-
port cases all involved claims that the Executive's restrictions in-
fringed a constitutionally protected right to travel. Only in Kent 
did that claim affect the Court's construction of the statue. In the 
remaining cases, the Court turned to the constitutional claim 
only after deferring to the executive interpretation, and in each 
case the Court dismissed that claim. 
Because delegation and implied powers questions are 
closely related, and because courts have been deferential to the 
Executive Branch in statutory construction cases in foreign af-
fairs, it is not surprising that congressional primacy scholars criti-
cize courts' approach to delegation questions and argue that 
courts should more narrowly construe foreign affairs delega-
tions.211 What is interesting for our purposes is that the argu-
ments for narrow construction are not typically premised on a 
view that principles governing construction of purely domestic 
delegations would suggest that deference is inappropriate with 
respect to specific foreign affairs statutes. To take the passport 
cases again, scholars do not argue that the Court should have de-
21la (1994)). 
208. One might argue that the Court did something like this in Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675 (1981), where it found congressional acquiescence in or ap-
proval of the President's decision to suspend claims of U.S. citizens against Iran and its 
enterprises, despite the absence of clear statutory authority for that decision. See notes 
252-263 and accompanying text. 
209. See Agee, 453 U.S. at 291 (citing cases holding that courts must follow a consis-
tent administrative construction of a statute). 
210. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 
531 U.S. 159,172 (2001); Edward!. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490,507 
(1979). 
211. See Bradley, 86 Va. L. Rev. at 664-65 (cited in note 177) (noting commentators' 
criticism of courts' deference to the Executive Branch in foreign affairs matters); see also 
note 21 (citing criticisms). 
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dined to defer to the Secretary of State's construction of the 
1926 Passport Act statute because, for example, Congress con-
ferred rulemaking authority on the President rather than on the 
Secretary of State,212 or because the reBulations in question were 
not issued after notice and comment.2 Nor do they necessarily 
argue that the Court's construction of the passport authority is 
inconsistent with the Court's typical approach to deference to an 
executive construction that raises constitutional questions.214 
Rather, the argument is more general-that foreign affairs stat-
utes should be construed against the Executive. 
Scholars attribute what they view as excessive judicial def-
erence in this context in part to a courts' failure to adhere to Jus-
tice Jackson's framework for evaluating executive conduct. The 
suggestion is that courts adhering to the framework would read 
congressional delegations more narrowly. But that is by no 
means clear. Under Justice Jackson's framework, the first ques-
tion is whether the President acts "pursuant to an express or im-
plied authorization of Congress."21 The difficulty in any case is 
determining what might constitute Congress's "implied" will. 
Nothing in Justice Jackson's discussion indicates whether courts 
should construe delegations in favor of or against the Executive. 
It might be argued that Justice Jackson's premise that presiden-
tial powers "fluctuate" according to their "disjunction or con-
junction with those of Congress"216 suggests a recognition of 
congressional primacy, and on that view courts should construe 
delegations against the Executive. This argument, however, begs 
the question: if the very issue in dispute is what Congress in-
tended to delegate to the Executive, a court cannot simply pre-
suppose that Congress intended its delegation to be interpreted 
narrowly based solely on Justice Jackson's rhetorical choices. 
212. The argument would be a weak one, since Congress also presumed that the 
President would delegate foreign affairs related functions to the Secretary of State. See 5 
U.S.C. § 156 (1958) (redesignated as 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (1994)) (requiring Secretary of 
State to perform foreign affairs related duties assigned by the President). 
213. Where the Executive Branch addressed the notice and comment issue in con-
nection with the passport regulations, it has suggested that the notice and comment pro-
visions of the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply because the regulations in-
volved the foreign affairs functions of the United States. See, e.g., 16 Fed. Reg. 482 
(1961) (regulation at issue in Zemel). 
214. Compare Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in Adler and George, 
eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy at 32-35 (cited in note 
21) with Koh, The National Security Constitution at 136-41 (cited in note 11). 
215. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
216. Id. 
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Because Justice Jackson gave no clear guidance on how to 
construe a congressional delegation, the claim that courts should 
construe delegations narrowly- that is, more narrowly than 
courts construe domestic delegations-depends on other norma-
tive arguments. Those arguments are not particularly persuasive. 
Since delegation questions and questions about the scope of a 
President's constitutional powers are closely linked, one could 
argue that an overbroad construction of a delegation will effec-
tively give judicial sanction to a power not in the Constitution. 
Even if that were true, it would counsel in favor of construing a 
foreign affairs delegation in the same way as a purely domestic 
delegation, not more narrowly. Alternatively, the argument for a 
narrow construction of a delegation may depend on a view that 
Congress simply should not delegate broad powers to the Presi-
dent in the foreign affairs context.217 Because this argument is 
largely prudential rather than constitutional,218 it does not pro-
vide a useful basis for a court to choose between a broad or nar-
row construction of a delegation. At most, concerns about 
whether a broad executive interpretation of a delegation would 
leave the Executive unsupervised by Congress might suggest that 
217. See Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers at 185-86 (cited in note 11) (considering 
whether separation of powers principles limit what foreign affairs powers Congress may 
constitutionally delegate to the President). 
218. The Supreme Court has not used the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a 
federal statute since 1935. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Court has, however, 
used a weak form of the doctrine to channel statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Industrial 
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607,642-46 (1980); Na-
t' I Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974); see also Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the 
Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1409-10 (2000); John F. Manning, The Nondele-
gation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 242-46; Cass R. Sun-
stein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315,330-35 (2000). In 1999, the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the Environmental Protection Agency's inter-
pretation of the scope of certain provisions of the Clean Air Act on the ground that the 
interpretation left the agency unsupervised by Congress in its regulation of pollution lev-
els. American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Some have argued 
that the case signaled the birth of a new nondelegation doctrine, under which courts 
would invalidate open-ended statutory terms unless agencies adopt a narrowing construc-
tion. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation 
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1415 (2000) (describing "newly 
emerging delegation doctrine" that "requires administrative agencies to issue rules con-
taining reasonable limits on their discretion in exchange for broad grants of regulatory 
authority"); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 
303, 309 (1999) ("Under the new [nondelegation] doctrine, open-ended statutory terms 
will be invalidated unless agencies are able to specify the governing legal criteria-to dis-
cipline their own authority through narrowing interpretations."). The Supreme Court 
reversed the D.C. Circuit's American Trucking decision, concluding that neither the stat-
ute nor the agency's interpretation left the agency unsupervised by Congress. Whitman v. 
Am. Trucking Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 903,913 (2001). 
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in such a case a court should adopt an alternative, more limited 
construction.219 But nothing about foreign affairs delegations 
makes a unique general rule of narrow construction appropriate. 
Nor do concerns about the scope of the President's constitu-
tional powers or concerns about Congress delegating too much 
of its foreign affairs authority overcome arguments for constru-
ing foreign affairs delegations in the same way as domestic dele-
gations. As noted, when Congress confers administrative author-
ity on an Executive Branch entity, it is presumed to have 
delegated to that entity the power to fill statutory gaps. One the-
ory underlying this approach-that an Executive Branch entity 
possesses greater expertise and accountability than courts in 
connection with the statutes that it administers220 -applies with 
full force in the foreign affairs area.221 More important, the fact 
that Congress legislates against the backdrop of these ordinary 
delegation principles places on Congress the burden to be more 
specific about its policy choices when it confers authority on the 
Executive, lest a court defer to an executive interpretation with 
which Congress disagrees. In other words, because a failure to 
resolve a policy dispute will enhance executive power, Congress 
will be more likely to be specific about its policy choices if the 
background rule is that a court will defer to executive interpreta-
tions of ambiguous statutes than it would be if the rule were that 
a court will adopt its own interpretation of a statute.222 
In arguing that courts should treat foreign affairs and do-
mestic delegations similarly, I do not suggest that courts should 
always defer to an executive construction of a foreign affairs 
219. See Manning, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 242-46 (cited in note 218) (discussing 
Court's use of the nondelegation doctrine as a canon of avoidance); Bressman, 109 Yale 
L.J. at 1409-10 (cited in note 218) (same); Sunstein, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 330-35 (cited in 
note 218). 
220. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. 
221. See Bradley, 86 Va. L. Rev. at 680 (cited in note 177) (suggesting that Chevron 
may apply "with special force" to foreign affairs statutes). 
222. See id. at 674 ("[T)o the extent that Step One of Chevron encourages Congress 
to be more specific in its enactments, it may actually reduce Executive power over 
time."); Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 Ad. L.J. 269, 281 (1988) ("[I]f it is desirable to have the 
legislature be more precise in its delegations ... it is more likely to result from judicial 
deference than from judicial lawmaking .... [A] policy of deference clearly tells Congress 
that if it wants any meaningful control of the executive, post-Chadha, it can no longer 
rely upon the Court to complete its work."); Richard J. Pierce, Political Accountability 
and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 391, 413-14 
("Once Congress realizes that broad delegations of vast prescriptive policymaking power 
constitute a form of legiscide and a transference of policymaking power to the executive, 
powerful institutional forces in the legislature can be relied on to induce major changes in 
Congress' attitude toward such delegations."). 
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statute, or even that it will always be easy for a court to resolve 
whether it should defer. The point is that the answers to these 
questions do not vary simply because they arise in the foreign af-
fairs context. There are several unanswered questions about 
when and how Chevron deference generally applies.223 Two dif-
ficulties are worth noting here. 
First is a question likely to recur in the foreign affairs area: 
whether a court should defer to an executive interpretation of a 
statute when that interpretation raises a constitutional question. 
As previously noted, the Court has on some occasions declined 
to defer to executive interpretations that raise constitutional 
questions in the context of purely domestic delegations.224 In 
other words, the Court has concluded that its "avoidance 
canon" -a rule of statutory construction requiring it to avoid a 
reading of a statute that raises serious constitutional questions if 
another reading is available225 - trumps Chevron deference. On 
at least one occasion, however, the Court has taken an approach 
more consistent with a different version of the avoidance 
canon-one of avoiding a construction of a statute that would be 
unconstitutional.226 The choice between these approaches is ob-
viously an important one: Kent is more consistent with a view 
that the courts should not defer to an executive construction of a 
statute that raises constitutional questions; Zemel and Agee, as 
223. See generally Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo. L.J. at 840-52 (cited in note 202). 
224. See note 210 and accompanying text. 
225. For discussion of the development of the avoidance canon, see William K. Kel-
ley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 
831, 836-43 (2001); John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1495 (1997). 
226. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991); see also Kelley, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 
at 894 (cited in note 225) (observing that "notwithstanding the Court's claims to the con-
trary, the constitutional objections raised" in Rust "were fairly termed serious"); Thomas 
W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 989 n.87 (1992) 
(suggesting that the opinion in Rust "can arguably be read as limiting the DeBartolo 
canon to cases in which the agency interpretation would be unconstitutional, as opposed 
to merely raising a 'serious question' of constitutionality") (emphasis added). For discus-
sion of the two versions of the avoidance canon, see Kelley, 86 Cornell L. Rev. at 893-41 
(cited in note 225) (describing Court's shift from "classical avoidance," under which 
courts would avoid readings of statutes that were actually unconstitutional, to "modern 
avoidance," under which courts would avoid readings of statutes that raised constitu-
tional questions); Nagle, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1495-98 (cited in note 225) (discuss-
ing shift in Court's approach in United States ex rei. Attorney General v. Delaware & 
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909)); Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 
1945, 1949 (1997) (distinguishing classical avoidance and modern avoidance; suggesting 
that "the former requires the court to determine that one plausible interpretation of the 
statute would be unconstitutional, while the latter requires only a determination that one 
plausible reading might be unconstitutional") (emphasis added). 
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well as Regan v. Wald,227 a case involving Treasury Department 
regulations that had the effect of restricting travel to Cuba, are 
more consistent with a view that courts can defer to an executive 
construction of a statute that raises constitutional questions so 
long as the executive action is not actually unconstitutional.228 
The point for present purposes is that the question whether the 
avoidance of constitutional questions canon should trump Chev-
ron deference arises in connection with purely domestic delega-
tions as well as foreign affairs delegations.229 The fact that some 
foreign affairs delegations raise constitutional questions, then, 
does not mean that all foreign affairs dele~ations should be 
treated differently from domestic delegations.2 0 
The second question is whether courts should defer not only 
to an executive entity's policy when Congress has left a gap in a 
statutory scheme, but also to the executive entity's interpretation 
of the scope of its own authority. The Supreme Court has never 
227. 468 U.S. 222 (1984). 
228. Wald involved Treasury Department regulations that prohibited certain trans-
actions involving property in which Cuba or any of its nationals had an interest, but that 
exempted transactions incident to travel to, from, and within Cuba. Id. at 224. The regu-
lation was initially promulgated under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 
U.S.C. app. § 5b, which authorized the President to regulate certain transactions in times 
of war and during peacetime emergencies. In 1977, Congress amended TWEA to limit 
the President's power to act pursuant to TWEA to times of war, but by means of a grand-
father clause allowed the President to continue to exercise "authorities ... which were 
being exercised" with respect to particular countries as of the effective date of the 
amendment (July 1, 1977). Amendments to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 
95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 note). The Treasury De-
partment subsequently amended its Cuba regulation to remove the exemption for travel-
related economic transactions. 47 Fed. Reg. 17030 (1982). The Executive Branch con-
strued the grandfather clause in the 1977 amendment to TWEA to allow it to promulgate 
the more restrictive regulation, on the theory that the general property regulation in 
place before the amendment constituted an "exercise[ ]" of the relevant "authorit[y]" 
with respect to Cuba, thereby preserving the Executive's ability to impose additional 
property-related restrictions. Wald, 468 U.S. at 231. The Court could have rejected the 
government's argument on the theory that a construction of TWEA or the grandfather 
clause that would permit travel-related restrictions would raise constitutional questions. 
Instead, it affirmed the Executive's construction of the grandfather clause and rejected 
the constitutional claims. 
229. For competing views about whether the avoidance of constitutional questions 
canon should trump Chevron deference, compare Sunstein, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 335 
(cited in note 218) (arguing that certain canons can be justified as ensuring that "judg-
ments are made by the democratically preferable institution" -that is, Congress) with 
Merrill and Hickman, 89 Geo. L.J. at 914-15 (cited in note 202) (arguing that courts 
should defer to an executive construction that merely raises constitutional questions, be-
cause such deference serves goals of democratic accountability by preferring agency reso-
lution of indeterminacy rather than judicial resolution of indeterminacy). 
230. For a discussion of how certain other canons of construction specific to the for-
eign affairs context should affect Chevron deference, see Bradley, 86 Va. L. Rev. at 685-
94 (cited in note 177). 
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squarely faced this question, although it has, without discussion, 
applied the Chevron framework to scope-of-authority issues.231 
One court recently rejected, without detailed explanation, an ar-
gument that Chevron deference should apply to the Executive's 
construction of its scope of authority under a 1998 amendment 
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.232 One of the prob-
lems of applying a different standard to scope-of-authority ques-
tions is that those questions can be difficult to distinguish from 
ordinary interpretative questions.233 However the Court ulti-
mately resolves this issue, there is nothing peculiar about a for-
eign affairs delegation that makes the scope-of-authority issue 
more difficult in that context.234 
As this discussion suggests, although it is difficult to defend 
the Court's reasoning in many of the cases involving construc-
tion of foreign affairs delegations, it is also difficult to defend the 
argument that courts should construe foreign affairs delegations 
more narrowly than purely domestic delegations-or that Justice 
Jackson's concurrence tells us so. The hard questions about for-
eign affairs delegations, such as how to treat an executive con-
struction that raises a constitutional question or how to treat an 
executive construction of its own scope of authority, are also 
some of the hard questions about domestic delegations. Con-
gress legislates against the backdrop of the principles that govern 
courts' construction of statutes delegating administrative author-
ity, grey areas and all. It serves no particular interests for the 
231. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2000) 
(acknowledging principle that "agencies are generally entitled to deference in the inter-
pretation of statutes that they administer," but concluding that Congress "has clearly 
precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products"). 
232. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 
("The President's decision to exercise his waiver is given great deference by this Court; 
however, his interpretation of the breadth of that waiver cannot belie the legislative au-
thority from which it stems."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alejandre v. Telefonica 
Larga Distancia de P.R., 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999). For a discussion of the case, see 
Oren Eisner, Note, Extending Chevron Deference to Presidential Interpretations of Am-
biguities in Foreign Affairs and National Security Statutes Delegating Lawmaking Power 
to the President, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 411,420-22 (2001). 
233. Consider, for example, the debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan 
in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex reL Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988). See id. 
at 381-82 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
234. At least one commentator has suggested that "there are particular reasons to 
apply Chevron deference to scope-of-authority issues in the foreign affairs context," be-
cause "[c]hanging world conditions and the executive branch's unique access to foreign 
affairs information suggest that when Congress delegates foreign affairs authority to the 
executive branch, it often 'must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it cus-
tomarily wields in domestic areas."' Bradley, 86 Va. L. Rev. at 682-83 (cited in note 177) 
(quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,17 (1965)). 
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Court narrowly to construe foreign affairs delegations. If Con-
gress's failure to articulate a policy judgment threatens to shift 
power to the President, then Congress is more likely to make 
that judgment clear. 
If we shift the focus in cases involving construction of con-
gressional delegations from Justice Jackson's inquiry into "im-
plied" congressional will to an application of ordinary delegation 
principles, the respective roles of the courts and Congress shift. 
If a court's task ends in most cases with an application of ordi-
nary delegation principles, it follows that it falls to Congress to 
protect the other interests at stake-to ensure that a mistaken 
construction of its delegation does not result in recognition of 
implied powers, or to ensure that an accurate construction of its 
delegation leaves sufficient power in its own hands as a matter of 
policy. To the extent that congressional primacy scholars advo-
cate a broader vote for courts, they call upon the wrong branch 
to police executive conduct-and they are mistaken to think that 
Justice Jackson's concurrence dictates this approach. 
2. Executive Action in the Absence of Statutory Delegation 
I now turn to cases involving disputes over presidential 
power in which the Executive Branch is unable to point to spe-
cific statutory authorization for its conduct. In some cases, a 
court will have r~ected the Executive's construction of a statu-
tory delegation;23 in others, there is no statute at all for the Ex-
ecutive Branch to call upon. 236 As I will suggest, although schol-
ars criticize these cases as being excessively deferential to the 
Executive Branch, nothing in Justice Jackson's concurrence in 
Youngstown supplies a limiting principle. 
a. Inferences of Congressional Opposition from the Legislative 
Landscape 
For a court proceeding under Justice Jackson's framework, 
the absence of an authorizing statute does not necessarily re-
solve whether the Executive acted in "disjunction or conjunc-
tion" with the will of Congress. The concurring Justices in 
235. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675 (1981) (rejecting claim that 
statutes authorized President to suspend claims in U.S. courts again Iran and its state en· 
terprises). 
236. See note 115 (discussing the Keith case, in which the absence of statutory au-
thority was readily apparent, although the Court resolved the case on other grounds); 
note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the Pentagon Papers case). 
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Youngstown based their conclusion that President Truman had 
acted in the face of congressional opposition on two factors. 
First, they identified several statutes giving the President tools to 
forestall threatened industrial disruptions but omitting the 
power to seize the industry.237 In effect, the concurring Justices 
found that Congress had occupied the field, thereby blocking the 
course of conduct President Truman chose to pursue.238 Second, 
Justice Frankfurter focused in part on the fact that, in consider-
ing the Taft-Hartley Act, the House had rejected an amendment 
that would have granted the President seizure authority.239 In 
addition, one of the Senate sponsors of the legislation specifi-
cally noted that the Senate Labor Committee had considered 
and rejected including a seizure provision.240 The other concur-
ring Justices embraced Justice Frankfurter's conclusion.Z41 In 
other words, Congress's consideration and rejection of a particu-
lar tool for dealing with industrial strife precluded the Presi-
dent's reliance on it. Even if Congress had not occupied the field 
by providing alternative procedures, legislative history indicating 
a specific rejection of the seizure authority signaled Congress's 
opposition to that course of action. Inferences from the legisla-
tive landscape thus influenced the Court's determination that the 
President acted in opposition to Congress's will. 
These two approaches to finding congressional opposition 
resurfaced in the Pentagon Papers case.242 There, the Executive 
Branch sought, in the conceded absence of specific legislative au-
thority, to enjoin newspapers from publishing excerpts from a 
classified government study on the United States' policy in Viet-
nam.243 In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the govern-
ment had not met its "hea;] burden" of demonstrating that a 
prior restraint was justified. 44 In concurring opinions, Justices 
Black, Douglas, and Brennan emphasized the First Amendment 
237. See notes 62-69 and accompanying text. 
238. Compare this approach to executive power questions with courts' approach to 
state law preemption questions. If there is no actual conflict between state and federal 
law, a court will inquire whether "federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as 
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it."' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Fidelity Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). See also notes 287-289 and accompanying text. 
239. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 600 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
240. Id. 
241. See note 70. 
242. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
243. Id. at 714. 
244. !d. 
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aspects of the case and argued that no prior restraint on the pub-
lication of newsworthy information could ever be justified.245 
Justices Stewart, White, and Marshall, however, focused in part 
on the absence of congressional authority for the Executive 
Branch to seek an injunction in the case. Justice White (joined 
by Justice Stewart) and Justice Marshall each observed that 
Congress had passed several provisions designed to protect sen-
sitive government documents, but had not authorized the Gov-
ernment to seek to enjoin publication.246 This fact put the case 
on all fours with Youngstown. As Justice White put it, citing 
Youngstown, "Congress has addressed itself to the problems of 
protecting the security of the country and the national defense 
from unauthorized disclosure of potentially damaging informa-
tion. It has not, however, authorized the injunctive remedy 
against threatened publication."247 And like four of the concur-
ring Justices in Youngstown, Justice Marshall found it relevant 
that Congress "has specifically rejected passing legislation that 
would have clearly given the President the power he seeks 
here."248 As in Youngstown, the concurring Justices in the Penta-
gon Papers case found both that Congress had occupied the field 
with statutes that did not grant the President the authority he 
sought and that Congress had specifically rejected legislation 
that would have done so. 
A court determining whether the existence of related legis-
lation or the rejection of other legislation forecloses presidential 
conduct, however, faces a difficult task. Under the first ap-
proach, a court must somehow distinguish a situation in which 
Congress's action in an area related to the challenged conduct 
should preclude the executive action from a situation in which 
Congress's failure to speak directly to the issue "invite[s]" the 
executive conduct.249 Indeed, the notion that congressional ac-
tion in a related area precludes presidential conduct seems to 
245. Id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring) ("In my view it is unfortunate that some of my 
Brethren are apparently willing to hold that the publication of news may sometimes be 
enjoined. Such a holding would make a shambles of the First Amendment."); id. at 720 
(Douglas, J. concurring) (arguing that the First Amendment "leaves ... no room for gov-
ernmental restraint on the press"); id. at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("(T]he First 
Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the imposition of judicial restraints in circum· 
stances of the kind presented by these cases."). 
246. ld. at 735-40 (White, J., concurring); id. at 743 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Con· 
gress has on several occasions given extensive consideration to the problem of protecting 
the military and strategic secrets of the United States."). 
247. Id. at 740 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
248. ld. at 745 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
249. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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presume that Congress anticipates all circumstances in which the 
President may find it necessary to act. Under the second ap-
proach, a court must make highly dubious use of legislative his-
tory, relying on it not to aid its interpretation of a specific stat-
ute- which is controversial enough- but rather to discern what 
range of legislative proposals Congress can be thought to have 
rejected.250 In other words, under the approach of the Youngs-
town concurrences, a court can give significant weight to infer-
ences from the legislative landscape, independently of its inter-
pretation of a specific law.251 
b. Inferences of Congressional Approval From the Legislative 
Landscape 
This last point shows why the approach of Justice Jackson's 
concurrence is an ineffective restraint on executive conduct. If 
inferences from the legislative landscape are fair game in an as-
sessment of Congress's implied opposition to executive conduct, 
it is unclear why such inferences would not also be fair game in 
an assessment of Congress's implied approval of presidential 
conduct. The Supreme Court's much criticized decision in 
Dames & Moore v. Regan252 illustrates the point. In Dames & 
Moore, the Court again confronted the question whether the 
President could take action not specifically authorized by Con-
gress in an area where Congress had passed detailed legislation, 
but this time the Court upheld the executive action. The dispute 
arose from U.S. implementation of the Algiers Accords, the 
January 1981 agreements providing for the release of the hos-
tages taken in the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran. 
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEP A) 
authorized the President, in the case of an "unusual and extraor-
250. See text accompanying notes 239-240, 248. 
251. For an interesting argument that courts should rely on inferences from the legis-
lative landscape, not merely explicit authorizations or prohibitions, to keep presidential 
power in check in the domestic context, see Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an 
Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 189 (1994) ("(O]ne can see Jack-
son's Youngstown methodology as a balancing response to the demise of the nondelega-
tion doctrine: even though courts will not invalidate delegations as too broad, they still 
can construe the landscape of legislation to forbid delegation, if delegation seems in ten-
sion with Congress's wishes."). Professor Greene confines his argument to the domestic 
context, suggesting that in the foreign affairs context "the President should be permitted 
to act, subject to congressional denial of power by law," because "the division of power 
between Congress and the President has always been murky and ... the President has 
long taken the initiative, with considerable congressional acquiescence." Id. at 191-92 
(emphasis added). 
252. 453 u.s. 654 (1981). 
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dinary threat ... to the national security" of the United States, 
to declare a national emergency and to regulate transactions in 
property in which a foreign country or national has an interest.253 
The President had exercised his authority under IEEPA in 1979 
to block the transfer of Iranian assets, while permitting certain 
judicial proceedin§s, including prejudgment attachment of as-
sets, against Iran.Z 4 The Algiers Accords obligated the United 
States "to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts 
involving claims of United States persons and institutions against 
Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and 
judgments obtained therein ... and to bring about the termina-
tion of such claims through binding arbitration" in the U.S.-Iran 
Claims Tribunal established by the agreements.255 The President 
issued Executive Orders that nullified attachments of Iranian as-
sets, ordered the transfer of such assets, and suspended an?t; 
claims in U.S. courts that could be presented to the Tribunal.2 6 
When a district court relied on those orders to vacate a pre-
judgment attachment that Dames & Moore had received in a 
suit against Iran and its Atomic Energy Organization, Dames & 
Moore claimed the President had exceeded his statutory author-
ity. 
The Court relied heavily on Justice Jackson's opinion in 
Youngstown, and in particular on Justice Jackson's identification 
of three categories of executive action-action taken pursuant to 
congressional authorization, in the face of congressional silence, 
and in contravention of Congress's will.257 As to the nullification 
of interests in Iranian assets and the order that such assets be 
transferred, the Court found specific congressional authorization 
in the IEEPA.258 As to the suspension of claims, however, the 
Court found no specific authorization, either in the IEEP A or in 
the Hostage Act, an 1868 statute permitting the President to use 
"such means ... as he may think necessary" to obtain the release 
of a U.S. citizen held by a foreign government "wrongful[ly] and 
253. 50 U.S.C. §§ 170l(a), 1702(a) (1994). 
254. 453 U.S. at 662-63. 
255. Id. at 665. 
256. See id. at 664-65 (describing orders by President Carter that nullified non-
Iranian interests in Iranian assets and required the transfer of such assets for disposition 
by the Secretary of Treasury, and orders by President Reagan that ratified President 
Carter's orders and also suspended claims). 
257. Id. at 668-69. The Court did observe that executive action falls "not neatly in 
one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from ex-
plicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition." Id. at 669. 
258. Id. at 674. 
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in violation of the rights of citizenship."259 Rather than conclud-
ing that IEEP A in effect preempted the President's action, the 
Court found that Congress had approved of or acquiesced in the 
conduct in question. The key to the case was the Court's identifi-
cation of Congress's "implied" will. First, the existence of the 
IEEPA alone could not signal Congress's opposition to the 
President's conduct. Congress, the Court pointed out, "cannot 
anticipate and legislate with respect to every possible action the 
President may find it necessary to take or every possible situa-
tion in which he might act."260 Moreover, the absence of a spe-
cific statute that could be interpreted to delegate authority to the 
Executive did not foreclose the argument that Congress ap-
proved of the Executive's action. Both the IEEPA and the Hos-
tage Act, the Court reasoned, indicated "congressional accep-
tance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such 
as those presented in this case. "261 The Court focused on the fact 
that the Executive Branch had a long practice of settling claims 
of its nationals against foreign countries. Congress, the court 
concluded, could be said to have acquiesced in the practice?62 
Here the Court relied on language in Justice Frankfurter's opin-
ion indicating that a court could treat a long, unbroken string of 
executive conduct as a "gloss" on executive power.263 But the 
Court misused Justice Frankfurter's language: Justice Frank-
furter reasoned that a court could glean something about what 
the Executive and Legislative Branches thought about the Presi-
dent's constitutional powers by examining Executive practice 
and the congressional response.264 The Dames & Moore Court 
interpreted Congress's silence not as its understanding of the 
scope of the Executive's constitutional powers, but rather as a 
legislative authorization or approval of the Executive's conduct. 
259. Id. at 676 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 1732). The Court concluded, among other things, 
that the statute "was concerned with the activity of certain countries refusing to recog-
nize the citizenship of naturalized Americans traveling abroad, and repatriating such citi-
zens against their will." I d. 
260. Id. at 678. 
261. Id. at 677. 
262. Id. at 679-70. 
263. I d. at 686. 
264. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In short, a sys-
tematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress 
and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold 
the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our 
government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 
of Art. II.") (emphasis added). 
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The conventional critique of the Court's decision in Dames 
& Moore, like the critique of the Court's approach to cases in-
volving statutory delegation, is that the Court softened the barri-
ers between Justice Jackson's categories, allowing congressional 
opposition (inferred from the fact that IEEPA gave the Presi-
dent several emergency authorities but omitted the very author-
ity he sought to exercise) to be interpreted as congressional si-
lence;265 or allowing congressional silence (the absence of a 
specific statute that authorized the President's conduct) to be in-
terpreted as congressional approval.266 As with questions of con-
gressional delegation, however, the Court's decision in Dames & 
Moore in fact highlights the ambiguities in the Youngstown 
framework-in the instruction to search for Congress's "im-
plied" will. Justice Jackson's approach suggests that congres-
sional opposition to executive conduct need not take the form of 
a statutory rejection of the authority the Executive seeks to use; 
a negative inference from the legislative landscape will suffice. If 
that approach is correct, then it is not clear why congressional 
approval of executive conduct must take the form of statutory 
delegation; positive inferences from the legislative landscape 
should suffice. In other words, the problem is not that the Court 
in Dames & Moore disregarded Justice Jackson's framework; the 
problem is that the framework always had a significant structural 
weakness. 
3. The Costs of A voiding Presidential Power Questions 
The proposition that a court should not find that Congress 
authorized or approved Executive conduct in the absence of a 
statute delegating power-that Dames & Moore was wrongly 
reasoned-may be relatively uncontroversial.267 But the problem 
265. Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers at 15 (cited in note 11) (noting that "the Court 
has subtly turned the default presumption to one that assumes congressional acquies-
cence in the absence of explicit and narrowly drawn statutes that would deny discretion 
to the executive"). 
266. Koh, The National Security Constitution at 139 (cited in note 11) (arguing that 
Justice Rehnquist "effectively followed the dissenting view in Youngstown, which had 
converted legislative silence into consent, thereby delegating to the president authority 
that Congress itself had arguably withheld"). 
267. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1025-26 (1989) (criticizing Court's approach to statutory interpreta-
lion m Dames & Moore and suggesting that the "perceived public value" of the Execu-
tive's action underlay the Court's opinion); Lee R. Marks and John C. Grabow, The 
President's Foreign Economic Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by 
Acqwescence, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 68, 83-95 (1982) (criticizing Court's finding of "delega-
tiOn by acqUiescence" with respect to the suspension of claims issue); ArthurS. Miller, 
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goes far beyond Dames & Moore. One senses in Dames & 
Moore, as well as in the passport cases and Regan v. Wald, a de-
sire to avoid, wherever possible, resting presidential conduct on 
constitutional rather than statutory authority. Courts, of course, 
try to avoid constitutional questions if there are other grounds 
for decision. 268 But this norm gives courts no license to construe 
congressional delegations more broadly than ordinary judicial 
principles would support or to find congressional authorization 
outside of the context of a statute. These actions create the very 
constitutional questions they are supposed to avoid. 
We can in fact detect the seeds of this reluctance to give 
content to the President's constitutional powers in Justice Jack-
son's concurrence. Recall Justice Jackson's observation about his 
second category of executive action, where Congress is silent. 
Congressional silence, he wrote, may "invite[ ] measures on in-
dependent presidential responsibility."269 The outcome of the 
dispute is likely to turn more on "contemporary imponderables" 
than "on abstract theories of law."270 If Justice Jackson's state-
ment was purely predictive, he was right. Justiciability doctrines 
require or permit courts to avoid resolving many significant 
separation of powers disputes.271 But Justice Jackson's claim that 
powers "fluctuate" according to Congress's will also yields two 
related normative conclusions. The first is a prudential point that 
the task of policing the Executive should fall to Congress, not 
the courts, because the political branches are more likely to ar-
rive at a narrow resolution that will preserve the Government's 
flexibility in later, unforeseen circumstances. This view seemed 
to animate Justice Powell's concurrence in the Supreme Court's 
decision to deny review in Goldwater v. Carter,272 a dispute over 
President Carter's termination of the United States' mutual de-
fense treaty with Taiwan. Justice Powell argued that judicial in-
Dames & Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by a Political Court, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 
1104, 1112-13 (1982) (criticizing Dames & Moore Court's approach to the suspension of 
claims issue as resting on the conclusion that "an invitation for the president to act" 
"lurk[ed] somewhere in the interstices of the two statutes" the Court construed). 
268. See Ash wander v. TV A, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by 
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be dis· 
posed of."). 
269. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
270. Id. 
271. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution at 141-48 (cited in note 
11); Thomas M. Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Ap· 
ply to Foreign Affairs? 10-60 (Princeton U. Press, 1992). 
272. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
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tervention was inappropriate because Congress and the Presi-
dent had not yet reached a "constitutional impasse. "273 The Sen-
ate had considered a resolution declaring that Senate approval is 
necessary for termination of a treaty but had taken no final ac-
tion.274 Justice Powell suggested that "[i]t cannot be said that ei-
ther the Senate or the House has rejected the President's claim. 
If the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not 
our task to do so."275 In other words, so long as Congress was si-
lent, Justice Powell saw no role for the Court in resolving ques-
tions about the appropriate division of power.276 
The second normative point that flows from Justice Jack-
son's claim that powers "fluctuate" is one made by some execu-
tive primacy scholars-that because the Constitution confers au-
thority over foreign affairs and national security to the political 
branches, there is a "risk that judicial intervention will itself be a 
serious violation of separation of powers."277 Under this theory, 
judicial intervention would be inappropriate where Congress is 
silent, and may not even be appropriate when there is a conflict 
between congressional and presidential will. Four of the Justices 
who concurred in the decision not to grant review in Goldwater 
took this view. Because the Justices found no constitutional pro-
vision expressly governing the termination of treaties, the dis-
pute presented a political question that "should be left for reso-
lution by the Executive and Legislative Branches of the 
Government."278 The concurring Justices observed that a court's 
resolution of a political question can create "disruption among 
the three coequal branches of government."279 
As this discussion suggests, judicial reluctance to explore 
the scope of the President's constitutional foreign affairs powers 
has an impeccable pedigree: it was predicted if not promoted by 
Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence. The theory that judi-
cial intervention is inappropriate as long as the political branches 
have not reached a constitutional impasse, or as long as resolving 
the dispute requires looking beyond textual provisions of the 
273. I d. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
274. Sec 125 Cong. Rec. 13673 (setting forth text of resolution); Goldwater, 444 U.S. 
at 998 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
275. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
276. For an argument that the Court should not resolve such questions, see Jesse H. 
Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration 
of the Role of the Supreme Court 260-379 (U. Chicago Press, 1980). 
277. Powell, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 537 (cited in note 26). 
278. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003 (Rchnquist, J., concurring in judgment). 
279. Id. at 1005-06. 
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Constitution, allows courts to skirt questions of executive power 
even when other justiciability requirements are met. To return to 
the Taiwan treaty termination example, none of the Justices who 
would have denied review focused on the justiciability problem 
that would most likely be fatal under current doctrine-that the 
legislators who challenged the President's conduct lacked stand-
ing to do so.280 Rather, their opinions were premised on the fact 
that Congress had not spoken and on the fact that the Constitu-
tion provided no textual standards by which a court could judge 
the dispute. If those factors are the relevant ones, then they pro-
vide a route for judicial abstention from deciding the scope of 
presidential power even in a case like Dames & Moore, where 
the justiciability requirements are clearly met. 
Courts' reluctance to explore the scope of presidential for-
eign affairs powers has several problematic consequences. Re-
turning to Dames & Moore, first consider the effect of the 
Court's deference to legislative silence on the relative power of 
the President and Congress in the legislative process. Congress 
could have attempted to show its opposition to the President's 
conduct, but to do so formally it would have had to muster the 
two-thirds majority necessary to override a presidential 
veto.281Although the same is true when Congress delegates 
power to the Executive and a court validates an overbroad ex-
ecutive interpretation of that delegation, Congress legislates in 
the first instance against the background principles that guide 
courts in interpreting statutory grants of authority. A fear that 
the Executive Branch will expansively interpret the statute and 
that a court will defer to that interpretation should prompt Con-
gress to make its policy choices clear.282 When no statute is at is-
sue, in contrast, Congress cannot be presumed to know what 
background principles will govern courts' evaluation of its intent 
or courts' determination that Congress has by its silence acqui-
esced in a particular executive practice. In other words, it is 
more difficult for Congress to anticipate and respond to per-
ceived instances of executive overreaching if courts simply defer 
to congressional silence. 
280. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,830 (1997). 
281. For a similar argument with respect to the domestic context, see Greene, 61 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. at 189 (cited in note 251) (suggesting that in a case like Youngstown, where 
the President acts as the initiator of federal action, "one could argue that requiring a su-
permajority in both Houses to check the President throws the balance of powers out of 
whack, threatening to leave the President with an extraordinary combination of policy 
making and executive powers"). 
282. See note 222 and accompanying text. 
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Consider second the fact that the combination of congres-
sional silence and judicial abstention will create power where the 
Constitution does not. If presidential powers are legitimate, they 
must stem from some source-statutory or constitutional. In this 
sense, the notion that presidential powers "fluctuate" is mislead-
ing. The Constitution either grants the President power or it 
does not. It is true that Congress may, through the exercise of its 
own constitutionally granted authority, limit some presidential 
conduct, but its failure to do so does not create presidential 
power. At most, congressional silence despite awareness that the 
executive is engaging in certain conduct provides, as Justice 
Frankfurter suggested, a "gloss" on the President's constitutional 
powers. In other words, congressional silence may indicate 
something about Congress's understanding of the scope of the 
President's constitutional powers, but it does not create a presi-
dential power independent of the Constitution. For this reason, 
it is somewhat surprising that many congressional primacy schol-
ars recognize that the President possesses certain "initiating"283 
or "concurrent"284 powers, the exercise of which is contingently 
constitutional.285 Since these powers are not enumerated in the 
constitutional text, to recognize their existence is to recognize 
that some of the President's foreign affairs powers are nontex-
tual-that they must be inferred from the constitutional text and 
the structure the Constitution creates. If this is the case, then any 
justification for courts' posture of deference to executive action 
and congressional silence evaporates. Whatever the scope of the 
political question doctrine might be, it does not apply when the 
question presented concerns only the constitutional division of 
authority between Congress and the President. The fact that a 
resolution of the question demands interstitial rather than tex-
tual analysis does not make the question a political one.286 Con-
gress is in the best position to decide whether it concurs in a pol-
icy the Executive develops, but it is in no better position than a 
283. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 15 (cited in note 23). 
284. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitwion at 92, 94 (cited in note 11) 
(recognizing "some undefined zone of concurrent authority in which [the President and 
Congress] might act, at least when the other has not acted"; noting that concept of con-
current authority "is now accepted"); Koh, The National Security Constitution at 109 
(cited in note 11). 
285. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 15-16 (cited in note 23) ("The Constitu-
tion sometimes appears silent with respect to issues of decision-making authority. In 
such circumstances, concurrent power is said to exist in both political branches. . . . The 
President's initiatives here are contingently constitutional; their validity depends upon 
congressional inaction."); see also note 156. 
286. Cf. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
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court to determine whether the Executive has authority to de-
velop that policy. 
To see the problems in giving dispositive weight to infer-
ences from congressional action (or inaction), we need only ex-
amine the similarities between courts' approach to executive 
power questions and courts' approach to federal-state preemp-
tion questions. If a state law conflicts with a specific federal en-
actment,287 or if Congress displaces the state law by occupying 
the field,288 a court cannot give the state law effect. Similarly, if 
executive action conflicts with a specific congressional policy (re-
flected in a statute or, as Youngstown suggests, legislative his-
tory), or if Congress passes related measures not authorizing the 
presidential conduct, courts cannot give the executive action ef-
fect.289 When Congress is silent, however, the state law will 
stand; when Congress is silent, the executive action will stand. 
This analysis makes much sense with respect to state govern-
ments with reserved powers, but it makes little sense with re-
spect to an Executive Branch lacking such powers. The combina-
tion of congressional silence and judicial inaction has the 
practical effect of creating power. 
Courts' reluctance to face questions about the scope of the 
President's constitutional powers-express and implied-creates 
three other problems. First, the implied presidential power given 
effect by virtue of congressional silence and judicial inaction can 
solidify into a broader claim. When the Executive exercises an 
"initiating" or "concurrent" power, it will tie that power to a tex-
tual provision or to a claim about the structure of the Constitu-
tion. Congress's silence as a practical matter tends to validate the 
executive rationale, and the Executive Branch may then claim a 
power not only to exercise the disputed authority in the face of 
congressional silence, but also to exercise the disputed authority 
in the face of congressional opposition. In other words, a power 
that the Executive Branch claims is "implied" in the Constitu-
tion may soon become an "implied" and "plenary" one. Ques-
tions about presidential power to terminate treaties provide a 
287. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev't 
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,204 (1983). 
288. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (finding preemption 
appropriate where "federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make rea· 
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it'") (quot-
ing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) and Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947)). 
289. Assuming, of course, that the court finds no independent and plenary presiden-
tial power to engage in the conduct in question. 
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ready example. The Executive's claim that the President has the 
power to terminate a treaty-the power in controversy in Gold-
water v. Carter, where Congress was silent-now takes a stronger 
form: that congressional efforts to curb the power are themselves 
unconstitutional.290 
Second, courts' failure to resolve the contours of the Presi-
dent's constitutional powers creates uncertainty about whether 
some forms of constitutionally based executive action have the 
same legal force as a federal statute. Returning to Dames & 
Moore, the fact that the Court rested the President's authority 
on grounds of congressional approval rather than implied consti-
tutional authority avoided the difficult question of how the 
President could by his sole authority displace the application of 
the federal statutes that had provided the basis for Dames & 
Moore's original cause of action against the Iranian enter-
prises.291 Similar questions arise with respect to the displacement 
of state law by operation of sole executive agreements. The re-
sult is confusion about whether sole executive agreements are 
the "supreme Law of the Land,"292 with the available precedents 
suggesting that they are293 and the weight of recent commentary 
suggesting that they are not.294 
Third and most important, courts' failure to resolve the 
scope of the President's constitutional powers compromises one 
of the most effective restraints on Executive Branch conduct-
the legal evaluations of the Executive Branch itself. Congres-
sional primacy scholars tend to give little weight to the Executive 
290. See Christopher Schroeder, Acting Assistant Att'y General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, Memorandum for Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and Legal 
Adviser to the National Security Council, Validity of Congressional-Executive Agree-
ments that Substantially Modify the United States' Obligations Under an Existing 
Treaty, 1996 WL 1185163 (Nov. 25, 1996) (noting Executive Branch's position that Presi-
dent has constitutional authority to terminate treaties without advice and consent of Sen-
ate). 
291. Cf. Marks and Grabow, 68 Cornell L. Rev. at 97 (cited in note 267) ("(T]he 
Court nowhere explained how the President's international agreement can change the 
substantive law governing litigation in United States courts."). 
292. U.S. Const., Art. VI. 
293. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 
u.s. 203 (1942). 
294. See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power, 77 
N.C. L. Rev. 133, 234-35 (1998) (arguing that Belmont was wrongly reasoned because the 
executive agreement "would have provided no source of rights in U.S. Jaw until it was (as 
it presumably could have been) enacted by Congress"); G. Edward White, The Trans-
formation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1, 115-16 
(1999) (criticizing Court's reasoning in Belmont); see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation 
of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321, 1445-49 (2001) (discussing 
whether sole executive agreement at issue in Belmont could preempt state law). 
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Branch's views on the Constitution's allocation of power over 
foreign affairs and national security,295 as embodied in the fact of 
executive practice and in the formal opinions explaining that 
practice.29 As others have argued, there is more to executive 
practice and opinion than some congressional primacy scholars 
recognize: they reflect the Executive Branch's interpretation of 
the Constitution- an interpretation that is entitled to at least 
some deference; they tend to rely on the same sources and use 
the same methodological approach as judicial opinions; and they 
provide a body of constitutional interpretation in an area where 
case law is sparse.297 That said, the dearth of case law gives Ex-
ecutive Branch lawyers little to work with in the foreign affairs 
context. Under the prevailing approach, much interpretation of 
the President's foreign affairs powers is concededly nontextual. 
For example, the Executive Branch claims a power to recognize 
foreign governments and to dictate the terms on which recogni-
tion occurs.298 No clause of the Constitution explicitly grants that 
power; Executive Branch lawyers rely both on the President's 
textual authority to receive foreign ambassadors, and on infer-
ences from the structure the Constitution creates. The nation 
must speak with one voice in dealings with foreign governments; 
the President is in a better position than Congress to do so; the 
President is therefore the nation's "sole representative" in deal-
ings with foreign governments.299 Many congressional primacy 
scholars accept the proposition that the President is the nation's 
295. See Powell, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 530 (cited in note 26). ("Neither the Su-
preme Court nor a great many scholars ... appear to place any confidence in the capacity 
of either political branch for principled constitutional interpretation."); see also 
Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office 
of Legal Counsel, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1303, 1303 (2000) ("Much has been written about 
the role of the courts in interpreting the law. In contrast, executive branch legal interpre-
tation has received considerably less attention."). 
296. The Attorney General has the duty "to give his advice and opinion on questions 
of law when required by the President," 28 U.S.C. § 511 (1994). The Attorney General 
has in tum delegated that responsibility to the Office of Legal Counsel, 28 C.F.R. § 
0.25(b) (2000), which renders formal opinions on, among other things, questions of presi-
dential power. 
297. Powell, 67 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. at 530-39 (cited in note 26); sec also Moss, 52 
Admin. L. Rev. at 1306-16 (cited in note 295) (describing "neutral expositor" model of 
the Attorney General's opinion function, which envisions a quasi-judicial role). 
298. Sec, e.g., Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplo-
matic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 21 (1992) (arguing that the Constitution "authorize[s] 
the President to determine the form and manner in which the United States will maintain 
relations with foreign nations"). 
299. One could imagine a plausible textual approach, grounding the recognition 
power in the "executive Power" the Constitution vests in the President in Article II, sec-
tion 1. Sec Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L.J. at 262 (ctted m note 142). That ts not, 
however, the Executive's traditional approach. 
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sole representative, but they too do not tie this power to a par-
ticular constitutional provision. On many other issues, the Ex-
ecutive Branch and congressional primacy scholars use the same 
nontextual methodologies to arrive at vastly different views of 
the foreign affairs powers.300 
My point is not that the structural methodology reflected in 
Executive Branch practice- and in the work of some congres-
sional primacy scholars-is improper. Rather, my point is that 
without some authoritative guidance developed in the crucible of 
contested cases and controversies, advocates of the executive 
and legislative positions will always talk past each other. If for-
mal Executive Branch opinions on foreign affairs matters are 
most legitimate when they adhere to the same methodologies as 
judicial opinions- and I believe they are- the lack of a coherent 
theory of the scope of presidential power in the case law re-
moves an opportunity for disciplining executive practice. With 
Justice Jackson's framework prevailing, the Executive Branch 
can establish congressional "approval" of its conduct untethered 
to any statute, and the Executive Branch can rely on claims from 
historical practice linked with congressional silence to establish 
its constitutional authority. 
As this discussion suggests, we make a mistake if we assume 
that courts' role is to police the boundaries of the "zone of twi-
light," but not its center. This instruction, taken together with 
the instruction to courts to detect "implied" congressional will, 
tends to yield outcomes vulnerable to charges that courts and 
Congress are both unduly deferential in the foreign policy proc-
ess: A court that searches for and finds Congress's "implied" 
will, particularly a will untethered to a specific statute, will be 
thought to impart legitimacy to a questionable exercise of execu-
tive power; a Congress that stays silent in the face of an exercise 
of executive power is vulnerable to charges that it is legitimizing 
executive encroachment. The analytical tasks are clearer than 
Justice Jackson's framework suggests. Where the Constitution 
does not clearly confer a particular power on the President, 
courts can evaluate executive action against the contours of a 
statute conferring authority on the President, giving deference to 
the Executive's construction where appropriate. Beyond that, 
questions of executive power in foreign affairs are questions 
about the scope of constitutional powers. Assuming other justi-
ciability requirements are met, courts should face those ques-
300. See id. at 236-52. 
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tions head on, even when doing so might require them to ac-
knowledge the existence of certain powers "implied" in the text 
and structure of the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Fifty years after the Supreme Court's decision in Youngs-
town, we can confidently say that the case was never "destined to 
be ignored."301 The Court's decision-in essence, that the gov-
ernment's actions do not achieve the status of law merely be-
cause they are the actions of the government-came as a sur-
prise to many at the time who had expected the Supreme Court 
to uphold the President's action. For lawyers in the Executive 
Branch who deal with separation of powers questions, Youngs-
town may offer little explicit guidance, but the case no doubt has 
a symbolic significance. As Marcus reports in the final footnote 
of her book, in a statement as valid today as it was in the mid-
1970s, such attorneys "do not often cite the case, but it is always 
in the back of their minds. "302 
What perhaps made it difficult for commentators of the day 
to foresee Youngstown's symbolic importance to our constitu-
tional system, and what perhaps makes it easy today to place too 
much emphasis on Youngstown's doctrinal importance, is that at 
every turn we can detect two Youngstowns. Youngstown is at 
once formal and functional. Youngstown at once finds a violation 
of separation of powers and offers a methodology for courts to 
avoid doing so. Justice Jackson's concurrence at once recognizes 
the importance of limiting presidential conduct and provides 
courts with ready routes for upholding questionable presidential 
conduct. In short, the Youngstown decision at once casts a 
shadow over assertions of presidential power and invites asser-
tions of presidential power to lurk in its shadows. 
301. Schubert, W. Pol. Q. at 64 (cited in note 3). 
302. Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 58-358 n.31 (cited in note 14) (cit-
ing telephone interview with Leon Lipson, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel). 
